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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three separate essays.
In the first essay of this thesis, I study the underlying mechanism behind the decision
on living arrangements and household formation. The decisions to leave home and to
marry are critical decisions that are at the foundation of family formation with tradeoffs
between the benefits from parental altruism and the advantages of marriage. This
research uses large-scale micro data on Japan to study both issues jointly. This paper
proposes three possible drivers in the mechanism: (1) the strong economy of scale in
Japan generated by high living cost, (2) the weak bargaining position of women on
the living arrangements when they marry, and (3) the gender wage gap and the career
interruption cost for women. The results suggest that high living cost discourage people
to marry and live without parents and the bargaining structure encourage them to stay
single and live with their own parents. The wage structure seems to have relatively
weaker effects. In addition, the estimates on the preference suggest that individuals
dislike living with parents-in-law and desire to leave parents’ home, while marrying
potential spouse is preferable.
In the second essay of this thesis, Satoshi Tanaka and I study the implication of the
child support enforcement (CSE) policy. The child support enforcement policies, aimed
at protecting out-of-wedlock children from financial disadvantages, brought unexpected
changes in individuals’ marriage and fertility behaviors during the 1980s and the 1990s.
Our estimates from state-year panel data show that in states with strict CSE there has
been a significant decrease in non-marital births and a significant increase in marital
births. Taking into account all these changes, what are the effects of CSE on children’s
welfare? To answer this question, we build a heterogeneous-agent model that features
endogenous marriage and child-investment decisions. Exploiting the state-level variation
in enforcement, we estimate it using the National Vital Statistics Report data. We find
iii
that men’s increased willingness to marry is the driving force behind the shift from
non-marital births to marital births. As evidence for the mechanism, we show that the
number of marriages has risen in the states with strict CSE during the same period,
consistent with the model’s implication. Our model predicts that a large increase in
child investment comes through a secondary effect of CSE: the shift from non-marital
births to marital births increases child investment through its income effect.
In the last essay of this thesis, Bernabe Lopez-Martin and I study the long-run con-
sequences of recessions for young individuals and the impact of government taxation.
Recessions generate large increases in youth unemployment rates and young unemployed
workers suffer significant losses in terms of the expected present discounted value of their
labor earnings. We build a life cycle model with on-the-job human capital accumula-
tion and aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks (extended to consider ex-ante
heterogeneous workers). The unemployment rate for young workers is higher and we
find an important quantitative impact of the tax-wedge (consistent with cross-country
empirical estimates): in countries where the tax-wedge is higher, unemployment rates
are amplified, particularly for young workers. We compute the long-term earnings losses
of individuals that lose their job in different states of the economy and find that losses
are bigger: (1) in worse aggregate states of the economy, (2) for younger individuals,
(3) in economies with a higher tax wedge, (4) for ex-ante lower ability individuals.
iv
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Chapter 1
Living Arrangements and
Household Formation in Japan
1.1 Introduction
Leaving home and marriage are critical decisions in the initial stage of family forma-
tion. When young adults leave their parents’ home, they may enjoy freedom from their
parents, but they also lose the benefit of parental altruism. However, when these young
adults marry, they gain advantages, but they also pay the cost of commitment.
It is still unclear, however, what the key determinants are of the economic cost
and benefit of leaving home and marriage in modern economies. Understanding the
tradeoffs is crucial to study the mechanism of family formation and the macroeconomic
implications. To do so, Japanese society has very interesting and somewhat unique
characteristics. From age 25-44, around 30% of Japanese adults are single and living
with their parents even after they finish their education. This allows us to jointly analyze
the tradeoffs of leaving home and marrying.
This paper utilizes the large-scale micro data of the Employment Status Survey1 in
1The estimates presented in this paper is computed under the sole responsibility of the author, based
on the confidential anonymized data of the 2002 Employment Status Survey produced by the Statistics
1
Japan.
Table 1.1: Marital and Living Status of Japanese Adults
Male Female
College Education No Some No Some
Single living w/o parents 3.9 3.3 2.7 6.1
Single living w/ parents 5.6 3.5 3.7 6.6
Married to non-college w/o parents 9.9 4.1 9.9 3.4
Married to some-college w/o parents 3.4 9.4 4.1 9.4
Married to non-college w/ own parents 2.8 0.9 0.6 0.2
Married to some-college w/ own parents 0.7 1.3 0.1 0.2
Married to non-college w/ in-laws 0.6 0.1 2.8 0.7
Married to some-college w/ in-laws 0.2 0.2 0.9 1.3
(Total) 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8
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Figure 1.1: Wage Profile
Table 1.1 shows that (1) there are more educated women than educated men, (2)
many people live with parents even after marriage, (3) the marriage pattern is assor-
tative, (4) substantially more couples live with husband’s parents than wife’s parents,
and (5) educated women are more likely to be single and live with parents.
Bureau, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Government of Japan and provided
by the National Statistics Center in Japan under the Statistics Act (Act No. 53 of May 23, 2007) in
Japan.
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This paper proposes three possible drivers in the underlying of mechanism behind
the decision on the marital and living status: (1) the stronger economy of scale in Japan
generated by high living cost, (2) the weak bargaining position of women on the living
arrangement when they marry, and (3) the gender wage gap and the career interruption
cost for women we can see from the figure 1.1.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the contribution of those determinants of the
cost and benefit structure when people consider leaving home and marrying. Specifically,
the benefit from parental altruism and the advantages of marriage are impossible to
directly observe. Thus, this paper builds a heterogeneous agent macroeconomic model,
and the key deep parameters of decisions on family formation are estimated through
the method of moments.
The results suggest that high living cost discourage people to marry and live without
parents and the bargaining structure encourage them to stay single and live with their
own parents. The wage structure seems to have relatively weaker effects. In addition,
the estimates on the preference suggest that individuals dislike to live with parents-in-
law and desire to leave parents’ home, while marrying potential spouse is preferable.
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, much empirical research
has been conducted on the altruistic link in families. As Altonji et al. (1997) and
Hayashi (1995) found, the existence of pure altruism is generally rejected for both the
United States and Japan. Namely, resource allocation within a family may depend on
the income distribution within the family. However, partial altruism may still have a sig-
nificant effect and this possibility is considered in this paper. Second, the methodology
of this paper is based on family macroeconomics literature. In particular, the strategy
to test the hypotheses is similar to Regalia et al. (2010) who study the impact of change
in the wage structure on marital status. Third, many sociologists pay attention to leav-
ing home and marriage in Japanese society. Yamada (1999) points out that there are a
number of rich young adults in Japan who are single and living with their parents, and
he argues that this phenomenon may widen the gap between socioeconomic classes. In
3
addition, Raymo and Iwasawa (2005) suggest that the larger decline of marriage among
educated women compared to less educated women is because of improving economic
independence of women in the labor market and continued dependence on men after
marriage. Thus, women may avoid or delay marriage since they are increasingly inde-
pendent and want to avoid such dependence on men. This paper contributes to the
literature by providing a quantitative explanation of the mechanism of family formation
in Japan.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, the model is introduced.
Section 1.3 describes estimations and simulations. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Model
In this section, we consider a parsimonious model in which the marital and living ar-
rangements are jointly determined. Each individual lives two periods as young and
old. Let the age a be y and o, respectively. When individuals are born, their genders
g, levels of education eg, and match qualities with their own parents θ
p
g are revealed.
Those attributes are drawn randomly and unchanging for their entire life. Let qg denote
(eg, θ
p
g).
Young individual can participate in the matching mechanism with probability λg. In
the mechanism, a single female with qf randomly meets a single male who is a potential
spouse with qm. Then, the female draws the match qualities with the potential spouse
θsf and the parents-in-law θ
l
f and the male draws the match qualities θ
s
m and θ
l
f similarly.
Let (θsf , θ
l
f , θ
s
m, θ
l
m) be Q.
Table 1.2: Matrix of Status
Single Married
Living Independently SI MI
Living with Own Parents SP MO
Living with Parents-in-Law - ML
4
Based on (qf , qm, Q), they decide to marry or not and whom they live with. Thus,
their marital and living status can be one of the following five: single and living indepen-
dently (SI), single and living with own parents (SP ), married and living independently
(MI), married and living with own parents (MO), and married and living with parents-
in-law (ML), as table 2 shows. After the marital and living status is determined, people
work and consume. They maintain the marital and living status when they become old,
so old people can not go to the matching mechanism again and there is no divorce.
In the following, the detail of the above are presented from the period utility, the
choice of marital and living status, the matching process, to the equilibrium.
1.2.1 Period Utility
After the marital and living status is determined, individuals work and consume.
Staying Single
Suppose a female does not get married. She may live independently or with her parents.
If she lives independently, her period utility is
USIfa (qf , qm, Q) =
(wSfae)
1−σ
1− σ ,
where w is wage which depends on marital status, gender, age and education. In this
case, she gets wage for single (S), female (f), her age (a) and her education (e).
If she lives with her parents, her period utility is
USPfa (qf , qm, Q) =
(
wSfae
φSP
)1−σ
1-σ
+ θpf ,
This appears similar to the previous one, but there are two important differences. First,
5
the economy of scale for singles living with parents is introduced by the equivalence
scale φSP . Second, the match quality with her parent θpf is added.
2
Single males gains similarly.3
Getting/Staying Married
For married couples, consumption is public between spouses. If a married female lives
independently, she gains
UMIfa (qf , qm, Q) =
(
wSfae+w
S
mae
φSP
)1−σ
1-σ
+ θsf ,
where φMI is the equivalence scale for married couples living independently, and her
husband gains the same except the match quality. The wife evaluates the match quality
with her husband θsf and the husband evaluates the match quality with his wife θ
s
m.
When a married couple live with husband’s parents, the wife lives with her parents-
in-law and gains
UMLfa (qf , qm, Q) =
(
wMfae+w
M
mae
φMP
)1−σ
1-σ
+ θsf + θ
l
f ,
where φMP is the equivalence scale for married couples living with parents, and the
husband lives with his own parents and gains
UMOma (qm, qf , Q) =
(
wMfae+w
M
mae
φMP
)1−σ
1-σ
+ θsm + θ
p
m,
Those are similar to the one for the married couples living independently. The
difference except φ is that in addition to the match quality with the spouse, she evaluates
2Note θpf is included in qf .
3Replace f by m.
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the match quality with her parents-in-law and he evaluates the match quality with his
own parents.
As for a married couple live with wife’s parents, vice versa.
Note as consumption is public within households, the utility is non-transferable
between spouses and no spouse can compensate the other when they disagree.4
1.2.2 Choice of Marital and Living Status
The essential problem of the model is choosing the marital and living status X from
{SI, SP,MI,MO,ML}. Since they do not change their marital and living status after
they decide it, when a female with qf meets a male with qm and the match qualities
between them Q is revealed, their value functions for each marital and living status can
be written as
V Xg (qf , qm, Q) = U
X
gy(qf , qm, Q) + βU
X
go(qf , qm, Q).
With this payoff structure, the decision process of the choice of marital and living status
is depicted as in Figure 2. The first mover is the male. He can either propose to marry
the female or leave. If he leaves, he and she stay single and each of them can separately
choose to live with or without their own parents. The subgame ΓS corresponds to this
separate decision. If he proposes, she can either accept it or leave. If she leaves, again he
and she stay single and the subgame from this branch is identical to ΓS . If she accepts,
he chooses to live without parents, with his own parents, or with his parents-in-law.
The crucial point is that the male can not commit to the living arrangement when he
proposes. He may say “we will not live with my parents” at first, but that promise may
not be kept if he really likes his own parents.
4This is crucial for the choice of marital and living status in the next subsection.
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Figure 1.2: Extensive-Form Game: Lack of Commitment
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1.2.3 Matching
Young females and young males meet in random matching mechanism. Let piOg (Bqg∗ , BQ)
be the probability measure of an event a single participating in the mechanism meets a
single with qg∗ ∈ Bqg∗ and match qualities Q ∈ BQ are revealed, where BX denotes a
set in the Borel algebra BX corresponding to the space of X. Then,
piOg (Bqg∗ , BQ) =
∑
e∗
αee∗ ∫ pie∗g∗1(e∗,θpg∗ )∈Bqg∗ dxSg∗e∗(θpg∗)∫
pie
∗
g∗x
S
g∗e∗d(θ
p
g∗)
pi(BQ),
where αee∗ is the probability a person with education level e meets a person with e
∗, pieg
is the share of people with education level e among gender g, xSge(Bθpg ) is the measure
of single people with gender g, education e and the match quality θpg ∈ Bθpg , and pi(BQ)
is the probability measure of drawing Q ∈ BQ.
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1.2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium in the economy is value function Vg, their corresponding policy
functions and measures of people by marital and living status {xSIge , xSPge xMIge , xMOge , xMLge }
such that
(i) the value and policy functions solve the individuals’ problem,
(ii) the marriage outcome is feasible for all combinations of couples:
xMIfef (Bθpf
, (em, Bθpm), BQ) = x
MI
mem(Bθpm , (ef , Bθpf
), BQ),
xMOfef (Bθpf
, (em, Bθpm), BQ) = x
MO
mem(Bθpm , (ef , Bθpf
), BQ),
xMLfef (Bθpf
, (em, Bθpm), BQ) = x
ML
mem(Bθpm , (ef , Bθpf
), BQ).
1.3 Estimation and Simulation
The parameters to be determined are on the wages, and the distribution of (qf , qm, Q),
and the utility.
1.3.1 Parameters Determined outside the Model
Wages
The wages wSgae and w
M
gae are set as in table 1.3. This reflects the college premium, the
gender wage gap and the cost of career interruption.
Table 1.3: Wage Structure
Female Male
College Education No Some No Some
Single Young .793 .942 1.000 1.129
Old .849 1.117 1.261 1.670
Married Young .793 .942 1.000 1.129
Old .793 .942 1.261 1.670
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Distribution
Table 1.4 shows the shares of people with education level e, i.e. pieg. The distribution
of θpg , θsg and θ
l
g are assumed to be common for both female and male and independent
normal distributions. The means and standard deviations for those three distributions
(µp, σp), (µs, σs) and (µl, σl) are estimated with the model. Also, we set αii/αij = α so
that people with the same education level are α times more likely to meet. This α is
estimated with the model.
Table 1.4: Education
Female Male
College Education No Some No Some
.502 .498 .544 .456
Utility
The scale parameters φSP , φMI and φMP are based on Asano and Wang (2008) who
estimate the equivalence elasticity between 0.3 and 0.5. The first adult in a household
is counted as 1 and the other adult is counted as 0.4. Setting φMI = 1.4 is a direct
application of this way of counting. As for the other two, since the adults living with
parents are additional members to the households, let φSP = .4 and φMP = 1.8. In
addition, β and σ are set to .9 and 2 respectively.
1.3.2 Estimation with Model
To estimate the remaining parameters Θ = (µp, σp, µs, σs, µl, σl, α)′, this paper relies on
the Method of Moments. Let M be the moments computed from the data and m(Θ)
be the moments generated by the model given parameters Θ. The 7 × 1 vector Θ are
estimated as
Θˆ = arg min
Θ˜
(M −m(Θ˜))′W (M −m(Θ˜)),
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where W is a symmetric positive definite weighting matrix. We set W = diag(M)−2.
Target Moments
As seven parameters are estimated, at least seven target moments are necessary. The
moments in table 1.1 is targeted and ther are 14 independent moments considering the
feasibility of match. Thus the estimation is substantially overidentified.
The Baseline
The model’s performance for hitting the targets are seen in table 1.5. The simulated
moments generally match with the data moments even though the model is quite par-
simonious.
Table 1.6 shows the estimated parameters. The match quality with parents-in-law
tends to be quite negative. The match quality with own parents also tends to be
negative but not as distinct as the first one. The match quality with potential spouse
has positive mean. Thus, all other things being equal, those estimates suggest that
individuals dislike to live with parents-in-law and desire to leave parents’ home, while
marrying potential spouse is preferable.
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Table 1.5: Baseline: Data vs Model for Targets
Data Model
Male Female Male Female
College education No Some No Some No Some No Some
SI 3.9 3.3 2.7 6.1 3.8 3.0 4.5 4.7
SP 5.6 3.5 3.7 6.6 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.6
MI w. non-college 9.9 4.1 9.9 3.4 9.9 3.2 9.9 4.5
MI w. college 3.4 9.4 4.1 9.4 4.5 9.6 3.2 9.6
MO w. non-college 2.8 0.9 0.6 0.2 2.6 0.8 0.5 0.2
MO w. college 0.7 1.3 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.3
ML w. non-college 0.6 0.1 2.8 0.7 0.5 0.1 2.6 1.1
ML w. college 0.2 0.2 0.9 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9
(Total) 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8
Table 1.6: Baseline: Estimated Parameters
in-law own parents spouse
mean -5.608 -2.249 1.414
stdev 3.897 2.556 0.885
assortative 1.425
1.3.3 Simulation
In this subsection, maintaining the estimated parameters unchanged, the model is solved
and simulated under a few different settings. This helps to understand the mechanism
driving the disparity between male and female as seen in table 1.1.
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OECD Equivalence Scale
First, the equivalence scale is set to the OECD scale rather than Japanese. The results
are presented in table 1.7 and we can see that people move into MI since now living
parentlessly is inexpensive and they tend to desire to leave parents house.
Table 1.7: OECD Equivalence Scale
Baseline Model
Male Female Male Female
College education No Some No Some No Some No Some
SI 3.8 3.0 4.5 4.7 4.1 3.8 5.4 4.2
SP 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.6 5.2 2.5 2.8 3.0
MI w. non-college 9.9 3.2 9.9 4.5 11.1 3.9 11.1 4.9
MI w. college 4.5 9.6 3.2 9.6 4.9 11.3 3.9 11.3
MO w. non-college 2.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.1
MO w. college 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.2
ML w. non-college 0.5 0.1 2.6 1.1 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.4
ML w. college 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8
(Total) 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8
Commitment
Next, males are assumed to be able to commit on the living arrangement when they
propose. Then the extensive-form game can be depicted as in Figure 1.3. Table 1.8
suggests that people would rather marry than just stay single and live with their own
parents.
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Table 1.8: Commitment
Data Model
Male Female Male Female
College education No Some No Some No Some No Some
SI 3.8 3.0 4.5 4.7 6.1 5.0 3.9 4.4
SP 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.6 0.1 2.1 2.4 2.8
MI w. non-college 9.9 3.2 9.9 4.5 11.1 3.0 11.1 4.6
MI w. college 4.5 9.6 3.2 9.6 4.6 9.8 3.0 9.8
MO w. non-college 2.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 3.2 0.8 0.4 0.1
MO w. college 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.1 1.8 0.1 0.3
ML w. non-college 0.5 0.1 2.6 1.1 0.4 0.1 3.2 1.1
ML w. college 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.8
(Total) 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8
M	
F	
M	ΓS	
ΓS	
F	F	
Leave	
Accept	
w/o parent	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w/o	 w/	 w/o	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Figure 1.3: Extensive-Form Game: Commitment
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Gender Wage Gap
However, table 1.9 and 1.10 suggest the effect of gender wage gap is relatively weak
compared to the above two drivers.
Table 1.9: Gender Wage Gap but No Career Interruption Cost
Baseline Model
Male Female Male Female
College education No Some No Some No Some No Some
SI 3.8 3.0 4.5 4.7 3.7 2.9 4.5 4.6
SP 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.6 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.6
MI w. non-college 9.9 3.2 9.9 4.5 10.0 3.2 10.0 4.5
MI w. college 4.5 9.6 3.2 9.6 4.5 9.6 3.2 9.6
MO w. non-college 2.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 2.6 0.8 0.5 0.2
MO w. college 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.4
ML w. non-college 0.5 0.1 2.6 1.1 0.5 0.1 2.6 1.1
ML w. college 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.9
(Total) 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8
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Table 1.10: Career Interruption Cost but No Other Gender Wage Gap
Baseline Model
Male Female Male Female
College education No Some No Some No Some No Some
SI 3.8 3.0 4.5 4.7 3.9 3.0 4.8 5.1
SP 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.6 4.6 5.4 3.3 3.3
MI w. non-college 9.9 3.2 9.9 4.5 10.0 2.9 10.0 4.5
MI w. college 4.5 9.6 3.2 9.6 4.5 8.4 2.9 8.4
MO w. non-college 2.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 2.6 0.8 0.4 0.2
MO w. college 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.1 2.0 0.1 0.3
ML w. non-college 0.5 0.1 2.6 1.1 0.4 0.1 2.6 1.1
ML w. college 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.8 2.0
(Total) 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8 27.2 22.9 25.0 24.8
1.4 Conclusion
The results suggest that high living cost discourage people to marry and live without
parents and the bargaining structure encourage them to stay single and live with their
own parents. The wage structure seems to have relatively weaker effects. In addition,
the estimates on the preference suggest that individuals dislike to live with parents-in-
law and desire to leave parents’ home, while marrying potential spouse is preferable.
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Chapter 2
Men’s Rush to Marriage:
Implications of the Child Support
Enforcement Policy for Marriage,
Fertility, and Long-Term
Inequality
2.1 Introduction
Since the late 1970s, the U.S. federal government has taken a number of steps to
strengthen the state-regulated, private child support systems. In the mid-1970s, it
created the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), required all states to estab-
lish comparable state offices, and raised federal funding for three-quarters of the states’
expenditures on child support enforcement. It also passed major federal regulations in
the 1980s requiring states to strengthen paternity establishment, to create legislative
guidelines for states’ child support orders, and to withhold obligations from fathers’
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wages. As a consequence, many states increased their child support collections signifi-
cantly (as shown in Figure 2.1) by establishing child support enforcement (CSE) policies
through the 1980s and 1990s.1
Figure 2.1: Child Support Collection Amount by States. Source: OCSE
However, these CSE policies have also brought unexpected changes in people’s mar-
riage and fertility behaviors in the United States. In addition to a reduction of non-
marital births, which is well-known in the literature,2 we find significant increases in
the number of marital births and also in marriages in the states with strict CSE. (See
Table 2.1 for a summary of our estimates.3,4) Why did these changes happen after the
CSE policies were strengthened? Furthermore, what was the effect of CSE on children’s
welfare if we take into account all these changes?
1CSE policies consist of child support legislation and plans of state’s expenditures for CSE cases.
The major CSE laws are on genetic testing, paternity establishment, wage withholding under delin-
quency, immediate wage withholding for new cases, universal wage withholding, and state income tax
interception. The years when these legislations were approved, vary across states. See the work of
Huang (2002) for more details.
2See the work of Case (1998), Huang(2002), Garfinkel et al. (2003), and Aizer and McLanahan
(2006), for example.
3In Table 1, the marriage rate is defined as the number of marriages per population. To create the
total fertility rate (total period fertility rate), first we calculate age-specific marital and non-marital
birth rates for six age groups. Then we sum them up and multiply the sum by five.
4According to our estimate, a 10% increase in the child support collection rate has decreased the
total fertility rate for non-marital births by 9.8%, increased the total fertility rate for marital births by
1.1%, and increased the marriage rate by 3.1% (as summarized in Table 1) relative to the trends.
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Table 2.1: The Effects of a 10% Increase in the Child Support Collection Rate
Variable Level in 1980 Changes in Level Changes in %
Total Fertility Rate
for Non-Marital Births 0.304 −∆ 0.0297 −∆ 9.8%
for Marital Births 1.582 +∆ 0.0172 +∆ 1.1%
Marriage Rate 0.042 +∆ 0.0013 +∆ 3.1%
To address these issues, we build a heterogeneous-agent model which features mar-
riage and child investment decisions. In our model, people form marital or non-marital
relationships in a stable matching equilibrium and also choose the number and the qual-
ity of children within each relationship. As in the work of Weiss and Willis (1985), here
marriage allows couples to achieve the efficient level of public good investment. If a
couple chooses a non-marital relationship, however, only the mother can determine the
level of child investment; the father transfers child support payments to the mother but
often at inefficiently low levels because of the lack of coordination. We compute our
model by extending the Gale and Shapley (1962) algorithm. And we estimate using
the total fertility rate for marital and non-marital births (the National Vital Statistics
Report: Natality data published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention),
exploiting the exogenous variations in CSE across the states during the period 1980 -
1997.
We find that men’s increased willingness to marry is the driving force behind the
shift from non-marital births to marital births. After the strengthening of CSE policies,
facing the larger cost per child due to the mandatory child support payment, men in
non-marital relationships may
1. Reduce the number of children and, instead, increase investments in child quality.
2. Reduce the number of children and, instead, increase the private consumption.
3. Get married to avoid the child cost change.
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We find that option (1) is not attractive to unmarried fathers, because to increase
a child’s quality investment they have to transfer money to the mothers. But these
transfers involve two types of inefficiency: First, in non-marital relationships, since the
mothers are not considering the fathers’ utility, they do not invest all the money in chil-
dren’s quality. They use some of it for their private consumption. Second, if the mother
in a non-marital relationship is on a welfare program, then the state government takes
away a significant portion of child support payments made by the biological father.5
Therefore, fathers’ investments do not really increase a child’s quality. And unmarried
fathers are thus left with options (2) or (3). Through our estimation, we show that men
split between reducing the number of children and increasing marriage when facing the
increased degree of CSE. This result hinges upon finding parameters that govern the
elasticity between the utility from consumption and from children.
After estimating the model’s underlying parameters using marital and non-marital
total fertility rates in the state-year panel data, we check the identification of the model
by predicting the increase of marriages found in the data. This is crucial to distinguish
our story from the other alternatives. From the reduced-form regression, a 10% increase
in the child support collection rate induces a 3.1% increase in the marriage rate and a
1.93% increase of the number of ever-married people at age 45. The model predicts a
rise of 1.39% in the number of ever-married people, accounting for 72% of the increase
in marriages in the data.
Finally, using the estimated parameters, we find that there are secondary, positive
effects of CSE on child investment. CSE was originally supposed to protect out-of-
wedlock children and, thus, to improve child investment in non-marital relationships.
However, we find that a large gain in the average child investment comes through a
shift from non-marital births, when we allow for the income effects on child quality
investment. Our model predicts that a 10% increase in the child support collection
5In most states, child support payments to mothers on Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) are now taxed 100%. Some states allow a $50 pass-through per month.
20
rate will increase average child investment by 1.1%. Assuming a general human capital
transmission function, we find that stronger CSE will men’s decrease 90-10% income
ratio of the next generation by 2.2%. We find that the effects are especially strong for
the bottom group of the income distribution.
Related Literature
Our work here is related to a sizable number of studies in the sociology and economics lit-
erature that examine the effect of CSE on non-marital births. Case (1998) and Garfinkel
et al. (2003) analyze state level data similar to ours. Case (1998) finds significantly lower
non-marital birth rates in the states where legislation allows genetic testing to establish
paternity, permits paternity establishment up to age 18, and establishes presumptive
guidelines for setting child support awards. Extending her framework, Garfinkel et al.
(2003) use paternity the establishment rate6 and child support collection amounts per
cases,7,8 and show significantly negative effects of their CSE measures on non-marital
births. Huang (2002), Aizer and McLanahan (2006), and Plotnick (2007) look into
microeconomic data. Huang (2002) and Aizer and McLanahan (2006) use the U.S. La-
bor Department’s National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to examine
whether CSE is related to the likelihood that a women’s first birth is premarital. And
both studies show that CSE reduces the risk of out-of-wedlock births. So do Plotnick et
al. (2007), but they use the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) for their analysis.
Compared to studies of non-marital births, not much research has been done on the
effect of CSE on marital births and marriages. Huang (2002) is one of the exceptions;
he uses the multinomial logit model for NLSY79 and finds a significant increase in the
6The paternity establishment rate is defined as the number of paternity establishments for non-
marital births over the total number of non-marital births.
7More precisely, they consider only cases with single mothers on Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC).
8Those are calculated from the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) 1980 - 1997 Annual
Reports to Congress.
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likelihood of marital births in the states with strict CSE. Our work is motivated by
his work, but we use state-year panel data constructed from the CDC’s National Vital
Statistics Report (NVSR). We show that there is an increase in marital births also in
our state panel data. For marriage, the work of Acs and Nelson (2004) is the only
research, as far as we know, which reports the effect of strengthened CSE on marital
statistics. They show that two-parent families have increased in the states where CSE
has been strengthened, especially among low-income people. They use the University
of Michigan’s 1997 and 1999 National Surveys of America’s Families and apply the
difference-in-difference estimation method to derive their results. Unlike their approach,
we do not analyze the ‘stock’ of married people. Instead, we look at the marriage rate
in the state-year panels. Our data cover the longer period, and our result is more robust
than theirs.
In terms of theory, our study is related to the growing literature on family economics.
One of the most relevant works is Weiss and Willis (1985). They show that non-marital
childbearing potentially involves inefficiencies in child investment. This is because single
mothers do not take into account fathers’ utility when investing, and if fathers know
that, they do not transfer much money to mothers. Del Boca and Flinn (1995) apply
Weiss and Willis (1985)’s framework to explain why child support payments are low
in the U.S. data. Our study is also based on the work of Weiss and Willis (1985).
And we extend their model to the stable matching problem. Other relevant studies
which analyze child support and/or CSE are those of Chiappori and Weiss (2006),
Chiappori and Weiss (2007), and Greenwood et al. (2003). All these use two-period
models, which enable them to analyze the divorce situations. Other relevant works
are those which apply the two-sided matching problem to an analysis of the marriage
market. Del Boca and Flinn (2005) compute a stable matching equilibrium applying
Gale and Shapley (1962)’s algorithm. We further extend their framework, allowing
for marital and non-marital relationships. Finally, our work is related to those which
study the intergenerational transmission of human capital. These include the work of
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Aiyagari et al. (2000), Greenwood et al. (2003), and Kocharkov (2010), who analyze the
effects of the government’s family policies on the next generation’s income distribution.
Also, in the growth context, De La Croix and Doepke (2003) and Moav (2005) show
that economies with a less equitable income distribution have a lower rate of economic
growth as the consequence of the quantity-quality trade-off of child investment.
The next section describes our economic model and defines an equilibrium. Sections
2.3 and 2.4 describe the data and the estimation methodology. Section 2.5 presents the
results and the implications. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model Economy
We develop a structural economic model in order to identify the channels through which
changes in the degree of CSE have effects on marriage decisions and fertility choices. In
our model, equal population of women and men enter the marriage market only once in
their life, form either marital or non-marital unions in a stable matching equilibrium,
and choose about a quantity and quality of children. Our model is static in the sense
that people make a decision about marriage and fertility only once in their lives.
Matching Problem
Males
Females
Marriage
Non-Marital Relationship
Two-Sided
Stable Matching Equilibrium
(cf , cm, n, q)
(cf , cm, n, q)
Figure 2.2: Structure of the Model Economy
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2.2.1 Setup
The agents in the economy are unit masses of females (f) and males (m), who each live
for one period. Among each of these types of agents, individuals differ in their human
capital level, hf ∈ Hf ⊂ R+ and hm ∈ Hm ⊂ R+ , and their charm level, af ∈ A ⊂ R
and am ∈ A ⊂ R. Assume that there is only a finite number of types of people in
the economy and that the number of types is the same for women and men. The sets
of all types of people are denoted as {(hfi , afi )}i∈If for women and {(hmj , amj )}j∈Im for
men, where If is the set of all indices for women’s type and Im is the set of all indices
for men’s type. We assume that n(If ) = n(Im) = Nh × Na, where n(X) denotes the
cardinality of a set X, Nh is the number of possible human capital levels, and Na is the
number of possible charm levels. Both Nh and Na are common across sex. We assume
that each individual possesses only one sexual identity, and thus let If∩Im = ∅. Finally,
assume that people are equally populated across each type (hi, ai).
After they are born, both men and women enter the frictionless marriage market,
where each person chooses one partner and forms a relationship - either marriage or a
non-marital relationship. As we will discuss later, people can form a relationship with
whomever they want as long as the partner agrees. But, by assumption, they cannot
have more than one relationship. Once people form a relationship, they determine
allocations, (cf , cm, n, q), where cf ∈ R+ is women’s private consumption, cm ∈ R+
is men’s private consumption, n ∈ R+ is the number of children for the couple, and
q ∈ R+ is the quality of each child for the couple. We assume that n and q are local
public goods within couples.
Preferences Preferences are identical across sex, and are denoted as u(c, a′) + v(nq).
People get utility from their private consumption c and from the number of children
times the quality of children nq. Also, they get utility from their partner’s charm a′.
For men who choose non-marital relationship, probably, fathers are not always staying
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with their children.9 And, thus, we take into account the possibility of a discount of
their utility from children as u(c, a′) + δv(nq) where δ ∈ [0, 1].
Technology Couples in either marriage or a non-marital relationship invest in the
number and the quality of children. Increasing one unit of the number, it requires fixed
amounts of time φ and consumption good ψ. Increasing the quality requires an input of
per-child educational investment s. Then children’s quality is determined by a function,
q = f1(s) for married couples, and q = f0(s) for non-married couples.
Child Support Men in non-marital relationships make child support payments to the
mothers of their children. The payments consist of a mandatory portion and a voluntary
portion. Let whmγτ cs(n) be the amount of mandatory child support payments for men
whose human capital level is hm and who have n children out of wedlock, where τ cs(n) is
the child support order, which depends on the number of children and which determines
the payment rate from their income. Assume that γ ∈ [0, 1] is the strength of CSE,
which state governments can control. And, w is the market price of human capital.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Mothers in non-marital
relationships who meet an income test are eligible for AFDC and receive monetary
payments. AFDC is a welfare program provided by each state government. In the
model, we assume that there are no differences across states. Mathematically, g(e, n) is
the amount of receipts from AFDC, which is decreasing in the mother’s income e and
increasing in the number of her children n.
r r
Decision on the Number Child Support Women’s Investment in q
min[ nf , nm] Mandatory + Voluntary
Figure 2.3: Timeline of Decisions in Non-Marital Relationships
9According to McLanahan et al. (2001), more than half of new unwed parents are not cohabiting in
the 1998-1999 data in the U.S..
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2.2.2 Couples in Non-Marital Relationships
Allocations within the couples in non-marital relationships are determined through three
stages, shown in Figure 2.3. In the first stage, women and men decide on the number
of children they will have together. In the second stage, men pay mandatory child
support, and choose the amounts of their private consumption and voluntary child
support payments. In the third stage, women choose their private consumption and
child investment.
Let us first focus on the last stage and go backward. Given the number of children
n, the characteristics of the couple Φ ≡ (hf , a,f hm, am), the strength of CSE γ, and
a voluntary payment of child support from the biological father T cs, a woman in a
non-marital relationship (that is, still single, S) solves the following problem:
V fS (n,Φ, γ, T
cs) ≡ max
cf ,s≥0
u
(
cf , am
)
+ v (nq)
subject to
q = f0(s)
cf + (ψ + s)n = whf (1− φn) + max
[
g
(
whf (1− φn), n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AFDC
, whmγτ cs(n) + T cs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mandatory+Voluntary CS
]
,
where V fS is the woman’s utility value, c
f is her consumption, s is the amount of invest-
ment per child, q is the quality of each child, ψ is the consumption good cost per child,
φ is the time cost per child, and g(wf , n) is the AFDC receipt. If there is a child support
payment to a woman on AFDC from the biological father, it is taxed 100%. Denote the
solution to the quality of the children in the above problem as q∗0(T cs;n,Φ, γ, ).
The problem for a man in a non-marital relationship is defined in the following
way. Given the number of children n, the characteristics of the couple Φ, the degree of
CSE γ, and the woman’s response function q∗0(T cs;n,Φ, γ), a man chooses his private
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consumption cm and voluntary child support payments T cs:
V mS (n,Φ, γ; q
∗
0) ≡ max
cm,T cs≥0
u
(
cm, af
)
+ δv (nq∗0(T
cs;n,Φ, γ))
subject to
cm + T cs =whm (1− γτ cs(n)) ,
Let T cs∗ (n,Φ, γ; q∗0) be the solution for the child support payments in the above problem.
Finally, in the first stage, the number of children is determined as the minimum of
the numbers which each partner wants:
n∗0(Φ, γ) ≡ min
[
arg max
n
V fS (n,Φ, γ, T
cs∗), arg max
n
V mS (n,Φ, γ; q
∗
0)
]
.
Once the number is determined, the utility values for each member of the couple in
a non-marital relationship are well-defined. The set of utility values is denoted as{
Vˆ fS (Φ, γ), Vˆ
m
S (Φ, γ)
}
Φ∈F
, where F is the set of all possible patterns of a couple’s
characteristics, which includes N2h×N2a patterns of coupling. Let Vˆ fs (Φ, γ) be defined as
Vˆ fS (Φ, γ) ≡ V fS (n∗0,Φ, γ, T cs∗) and Vˆ ms (Φ, γ) be defined as Vˆ mS (Φ, γ) ≡ V mS (n∗0,Φ, γ; q∗0).
2.2.3 Married Couples
Unlike couples in non-marital relationships, married couples stay together with their
children for a long time; thus, we assume that the allocation within marriage is deter-
mined through a Nash bargaining problem:
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max
cf ,cm,n,q,tf ,tm≥0
[
V fM (c
f , n, q; Φ)− Vˆ fS (Φ, γ)
] 1
2
×
[
V mM (c
m, n, q; Φ)− Vˆ mS (Φ, γ)
] 1
2
subject to
q = f1(s)
φn = tf + tm
cf + cm + (ψ + s)n = whf (1− tf ) + whm(1− tm)
V fM (c
f , n, q; Φ) ≥ Vˆ fS (Φ, γ)
V mM (c
m, n, q; Φ) ≥ Vˆ mS (Φ, γ)
and
V fM (c
f , n, q; Φ) ≡ u
(
cf , am
)
+ v (nq) + κ
V mM (c
m, n, q; Φ) ≡ u
(
cm, af
)
+ v (nq) + κ
where tf and tm are the time spent for child nurture by each member of the couple,
and which must sum to φn. Here κ ∈ R is the utility gain of marriage, which is
common across couples. We denote the solution of the utility values for the above
problem for married (M) couples as
{
Vˆ fM (Φ, γ), Vˆ
m
M (Φ, γ)
}
Φ∈F
. It is often true that
there does not exist a solution to the above problem. In that case, we simply assume
that Vˆ fM (Φ, γ) = Vˆ
m
M (Φ, γ) = −∞, so that couples choose non-marital relationships in
the stable matching equilibrium.
As in the work of Weiss and Willis (1985), here marriage allows couples to attain
the efficient level of public good investment through Nash bargaining. However, in non-
marital relationships, mothers choose their private consumption and child investment
without taking into account fathers’ utility; thus, mothers under-invest in children.
Furthermore, if fathers know their payments will not fully used for their children by
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mothers, they will not transfer enough child support payments to the mothers. Through
these steps, inefficiency in public good investment arises in non-marital relationships.
2.2.4 Stable Matching Equilibrium
In this economy, women and men look for a partner in the frictionless marriage market.
Again, they can form a marital or a non-marital relationship with whomever they want
as long as the partner agrees, but we assume that they cannot form more than one
relationship at the same time. Also, in equilibrium, all the agents must form some
relationship with a partner.
Formally, we consider a set of matchings (µS , µM ), where µS is a matching for non-
marital relationships (single S) and µM is a matching for marital (M) relationships.
Mathematically, µS and µM are mappings from If ∪Im onto itself.10 In particular here
we only consider the sets of mappings which satisfy the following properties.
Definition 1. A pair (µS , µM ) is defined as an acceptable pair of matchings if it
satisfies the following properties:
1. ∀R ∈ {S,M}, if µR(x) 6= ∅, then µR (µR(x)) = x.
2. ∀R ∈ {S,M}, if x ∈ Ig and µR(x) 6= ∅, then µR(x) ∈ Ig′, where g, g′ ∈ {f,m}
and g 6= g′.
3. ∀R,R′ ∈ {S,M} with R 6= R′, if µR(x) 6= ∅, then µR′(x) = ∅ for all x ∈ If ∪ Im.
In short, an acceptable pair of µS and µM is a set of mappings which specify the couples
in each relationship and in which no one in the pairs has more than one relationship.
Next, we define an equilibrium of the economy using these matchings µS and µM .
Definition 2. Given γ ∈ [0, 1], a stable matching equilibrium is an acceptable pair
of matchings, (µS , µM ), which satisfies these two conditions:
10Remember that we assumed If ∩ Im = ∅ at the beginning of this section. Thus, women and men
are indexed by different numbers. And, If ∪ Im denotes the entire set of types in the population.
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1. ∀R ∈ {S,M}, a woman i ∈ If with µR(i) 6= ∅ receives utility,
Vˆ fR
(
hfi , a
f
i , h
m
µR(i)
, amµR(i), γ
)
,
and a man j ∈ Im with µR(j) 6= ∅ receives utility,
Vˆ mR
(
hfµR(j), a
f
µR(j)
, hmj , a
m
j , γ
)
.
2. (No Blocking) There does not exist a pair of couples (i, µR(i)),(µR′(j), j), and
relationships R,R′, R′′ ∈ {S,M} such that
Vˆ fR′′
(
hfi , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ
)
> Vˆ fR
(
hfi , a
f
i , h
m
µR(i)
, amµR(i), γ
)
,
Vˆ mR′′
(
hfi , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ
)
> Vˆ mR′
(
hfµR′ (j)
, afµR′ (j)
, hmj , a
m
j , γ
)
.
The second condition in the equilibrium definition requires that there are no pairs
of a woman and a man who jointly deviate from their current relationships and obtain
higher utility by starting a new relationship with the partner. In other words, the
equilibrium is a core of matching game.
As in the last part of this section, we now pose a theorem for the existence of a
stable matching equilibrium. The proof is an extension of Gale and Shapley (1962)’s.
Theorem 3. A stable matching equilibrium exists in the economy.
Proof. In Appendix A.1.
2.2.5 Computing an Equilibrium
Definition 4. A stable matching equilibrium (µS , µM ) is M-optimal if every man likes
it at least as well as any other stable matching equilibria. Similarly, a stable matching
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equilibrium (νS , νM ) is W-optimal if every woman likes it at least as well as any other
stable matching equilibria.
Based on the approach of Del Boca and Flinn (2005), we focus on two extreme
stable matching equilibria, the one that is most beneficial to men (the M -optimal stable
matching equilibrium) and the one most beneficial to women (the W -optimal stable
matching equilibrium). A straight-forward extension of the Gale and Shapley algorithm
enables us to compute at least these two equilibria. In addition, because assuming that
each individual has strict preference over mates, each of these equilibria turns out to be
unique.
Assumption 2.1. All the agents have strict preference over partners’ types.
To satisfy the above assumption, differences in human capital level have to create
strictly different utility values for potential partners.11 When couples choose non-marital
relationships, it is not obvious because some low-income men might not make any child
support payments. Then if those men’s charm levels are the same, women become
indifferent among the different types of men. To exclude this situation, we assume that
γ > 0 always holds. If γ is strictly positive, then women get better off by having a
non-marital relationship with a man with higher income because the state government
transfers child support payments proportionally to men’s income. Thus, Assumption 5
is always satisfied.12
Theorem 5. Under Assumption 5, both the M-optimal stable matching equilibrium and
the W-optimal stable matching equilibrium are unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
11For charm, the utility function specified in Section 2.4.6 automatically creates strict differences.
12Here, we implicitly assuming that there do not exist (hmj , a
m
j ) and (h
m
j′ , a
m
j′ ) such that h
m
j > h
m
j′ ,
amj < a
m
j′ , and Vˆ
f
R (h
f
i , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j ) = Vˆ
f
R (h
f
i , a
f
i , h
m
j′ , a
m
j′ ) for some i and R. When we actually compute
an equilibrium and discretizing the state spaces Hg and A, it is the case only as a measure zero event.
Thus, we exclude the possibility of the case from our analysis.
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In Appendix A.1, we also show that these two equilibria can be computed by ex-
tending Gale and Shapley (1962)’s algorithm. In Section 2.4, we actually compute and
estimate an unique M-optimal stable matching equilibrium. Hereafter, we refer to a
stable matching equilibrium as an M -optimal stable matching equilibrium.13
2.3 The Data
To estimate the equilibrium which we defined in the previous section, we construct state-
year panel data from the birth and the marriage records of the CDC’s National Vital
Statistics Report (NVSR). In this section, we discuss the details of the construction of
our variables: the total fertility rate for marital and non-marital births and the marriage
rate. We also describe how we create the CSE measures and discuss some other control
variables like state characteristics.
2.3.1 Dependent Variables
We use three dependent variables for our main analysis: the total fertility rate (more
precisely, the total period fertility rate) for marital births, the total fertility rate for non-
marital births, and the marriage rate. For the marital and non-marital total fertility
rates, first we calculate age-specific (the mother’s age) marital and non-marital birth
rates for six age groups for each state and year from the NVSR 1980 - 1997, restricting
the mother’s age to 15 - 44. And we sum them up and multiply the sum by five. For
the marriage rate, we define it as the number of marriages per 15 - 44 year-old female
13In this paper, we only analyze the M -optimal stable matching equilibrium. But, there may well exist
other stable matching equilibria including the W -optimal stable matching equilibrium. Del Boca and
Flinn (2005) explore how much other equilibria could be different from the M-optimal stable matching
equilibrium by counting the pairs which exist both in the M-optimal stable and W-optimal matching
equilibria. In their case, the same pairs are matched in over 96% of the cases in the male-preferred and
female-preferred equilibria. And, they conclude that even though other equilibria exist, they are not so
different from the M-optimal stable matching equilibrium. We will leave the application of this stability
exercise for our future work.
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population.14 And, we calculate it also from the NVSR (1980 - 1995). The summary
statistics for the NVSR: Natality data are in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for National Vital Statistics Report Natality Data,
1980 - 1997
Name
Num. of Observations
State-Year Panels 908
Total Number of Births in the Data 69,315,940
Average Number of Births within a Panel 76,339
Mean Std. Deviation
Age of Mother at Child’s Birth 26.19 5.68
Age of Father at Child’s Birth 26.78 5.50
Mother’s Education Num. of Observations % in the Sample
HS < 13,360,589 19.27
HS = 23,428,527 33.80
HS > 23,463,224 33.85
Mother’s Race
White 55,610,558 79.79
Black 10,940,109 15.78
Ohters 2,765,173 4.43
14Although the best measure of the marriage rate would be the number of marriages per non-married
population, the stock of (non)-married people is only available for the years in which the decimal U.S.
Census has been conducted.
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2.3.2 Child Support Enforcement Measures
Our main concern is to analyze how people adjust their marriage and fertility decisions
to a change in the cost of non-marital births. Therefore, we think that the aggregate
collection rate of child support defined for each state and year is the most suitable mea-
sure for our main analysis.15 The aggregate collection rate is the total amount of child
support collected over the total eligible amount of child support. For the numerator, we
pick the numbers from the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) 1980 - 1997
Annual Reports to Congress (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980 -
1997). For the denominator, we calculate a number from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) in the following way.
1. Consider the sample of the married couples. Regress the husband’s real annual
income on the wife’s demographic characteristics and the characteristics of the
residential state, age, age-squared, education, ethnicity, whether or not living in
a central city, the unemployment rate of the state, and the average income of the
state.
2. Predict the income of the single mother’s partner from the above regression.
3. Based on the number of children the single mother has, apply the Wisconsin
guideline to determine the eligible amount of child support.16
15One of the difficulties with CSE measures is the possibility of their endogeneity. Case (1998) applies
the instrumental variable method by using the percentage of the state’s House and Senate members that
are women as an instrumental variable and still finds a significant negative impact of CSE on the non-
marital birth rate. Miller and Garfinkel (1999) employ the same strategy to control the endogeneity.
Without exception, our CSE measures might potentially involve endogeneity. We leave the problem for
future work.
16The Wisconsin guideline is a “percentage-of-income guideline” in which fathers’ child support obli-
gation is 17% of fathers’ gross income for one child and 25%, 29%, 31%, and 34% for two, three, four,
and five or more children, respectively. This percentage-of-income guideline have been adopted by 15
states, whereas other 31 have adopted variants of an income-shares guideline which takes into account
the incomes of both parents when determining the award amount. Garfinkel et al. (1998) examine
the two types of guideline and find that state rankings on the collection rate are not sensitive to the
guideline used.
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4. Calculate the total eligible amount for each state and year by summing up the
amount obtained in step 3, and then adjust the population of single mothers in
each state to match the numerator by using the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and
End Results (SEER) data published by the National Center Institute.
Our result is displayed in Table 2.3. Also in Table 2.3, two other child support en-
forcement measures are calculated to test the robustness of our estimation result. The
first one is the state’s expenditure for the child support enforcement policies per single
mother.17 The state’s expenditure data are from the OCSE’s Annual Reports, and the
population of single mothers is calculated from CPS and SEER. The second alternative
measure is paternity establishment rate, defined as the number of paternities established
for non-marital births over the total number of non-marital births in a given year. The
data for the number of paternities established are from the OCSE’s Annual Reports.
And the data for the total number of non-marital births are from the NVSR.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for CSE Measures, 1980 - 1997.
CSE Measures 1980 Mean 1997 Mean 1980-1997 Mean
Collection Rate 4.1 % 18.5 % 10.0 %
Expenditure per Single Mother 2.38 4.14 3.04
Paternity Establishment Rate 20.4 % 55.0 % 36.2 %
(The mean values are calculated across states.)
2.3.3 Other Independent Variables
State average wages of full-time workers and state unemployment rates are included as
independent variables in our regression analysis because they potentially affect people’s
marriage and fertility decisions. The former is from CPS, and the latter is from the Local
17The numbers in Table 2.3 are based on 2000 dollars.
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Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). The gender
wage gap as a fraction of the average wage of female full-time workers over the average
wage of male full-time workers is also included since it might affect, especially, female’s
marriage and fertility decisions.18 Three demographic statistics - the fraction of blacks,
the fraction of Hispanics, and the fraction of high-school dropouts - are the other controls
considered in the analysis. Finally, previous studies show that generous welfare benefits
make single motherhood more affordable and increase the number of non-marital child
births (Rosenzweig (1999), Neal (2004)). Thus, we include the generosity measure of
state welfare policy. The sum of the maximum amount of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) grant and food stamp benefit is used as this measure.19
All the monetary values are converted to the 2000 dollar values.
2.4 Structural Estimation
In this section, we describe our econometric methodology to estimate the equilibrium
values.
2.4.1 Two-Step Estimation Procedure
We apply simulated method of moment (SMM) to estimate the parameters of the struc-
tural model laid out in Section 2. In particular, we apply a two-step procedure similar
to that used by Voena (2010). The method is closely related to (but not the same as)
the indirect inference method, which is a simulation-based method for estimating the
parameters of economic models, first introduced by Smith (1990, 1993) and extended
by Gourieroux et al. (1993) and Gallant and Tauchen (1996).20
18See the work of Regalia et al. (2010), for example.
19These data come from the Overview of Entitlement Program: Green Book edited by the U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means.
20The difference between our method and indirect inference is as follows. In indirect inference, the
regressions in the first stage (called an ‘auxiliary model’) and those in the second stage must be the same.
But, in our case, the first-stage regression includes the state fixed effects, the state characteristics, and
the state-specific trends, which are not included in the regressions in the second stage. In the indirect
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Our method consists of two stages of minimization. In the first stage, we employ
the standard fixed effects regression model to obtain the coefficients of the variables
of interest to the changes in the CSE measure. In the second-stage regression, we
estimate the structural model’s parameters by SMM targeting on the coefficients which
we obtained in the first stage. More precisely, using reduced-form regressions, first, we
estimate the effect of CSE on non-marital and marital total fertility rates and obtain
the regression coefficients, (βˆS,Dataγ , βˆ
M,Data
γ ). Then, in the second stage, we calculate
structural counterparts for
(
βˆSγ (θ), βˆ
M
γ (θ)
)
and estimate a set of structural parameters
θ with other targets Z(θ) by
θˆ = arg min
θ
[
m(θ)T ×W ×m(θ)] ,
where m(θ) is a column vector
(
βˆSγ (θ)− βˆS,Dataγ , βˆMγ (θ)− βˆM,Dataγ , Z(θ)− ZData
)T
.
Here W is an arbitrary weighting matrix. The other targets Z(θ) are chosen so that
the model captures the important characteristics of the real data, like the total fertility
rate or the total educational expenditure in the economy.
As the last step of our estimation, we test our model’s performance by predicting
the marriage rate. As we have said, the marriage rate has also sharply risen in the
states with strict CSE. This increase in marriages is crucial to identify our story from
other alternatives. Therefore, we use it as an over-identification device for the estimates
obtained from the structural estimation.
2.4.2 First Stage: The Fixed Effects Regression Model
In the first-stage estimation, we use the fixed effects regression model. Moreover, we
include state-specific time trends21 in our benchmark model. Focusing on the period
inference method, even if the independent variables are endogenous in the first-stage regression, one
can obtain the consistent estimator in the structural estimation. But, in our case, if the independent
variables are endogenous, then the estimated structural parameters are no longer consistent.
21The literature includes several discussions on the inclusion of state-specific time trends. Friedberg
(1998) talks about the importance of them to measure the impacts of the divorce law reform on the
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1980 - 1997, we run the following regressions on the state-year panel data:
Y Ss,t = β
S
0 + β
S′
1 Xs,t +
∑
s
βS2,sDs +
∑
s
βS3,s (Ds × t) + βSγ γs,t
YMs,t = β
M
0 + β
M ′
1 Xs,t +
∑
s
βM2,sDs +
∑
s
βM3,s (Ds × t) + βMγ γs,t,
In the above regressions, Y Ss,t and Y
M
s,t are the total fertility rate for non-marital and
marital births in state s in year t. Here Xs,t includes the characteristics of state s in
year t: the average wage of full-time workers, the state unemployment rate, the gender
wage gap, the fraction of black people, the fraction of Hispanic people, the fraction of
people without a high-school diploma, and also the measure of the generosity of welfare
for single mothers. Here Ds is a state dummy and (Ds× t) is a state-specific time trend.
Finally, γs,t is the three-year moving average of the CSE measure.
22
2.4.3 First Stage: Results
The results of the first-stage regressions are summarized in Table 2.4. For the non-
marital fertility rate, all three CSE measures have negative effects which are significant
at the 1% level. Looking at the coefficient for the fraction of black people, you may
wonder why it is significantly negative. But this is true when we include the state fixed
effects, and other studies are also getting the same result.23 For marital births, the
effects of CSE seem to be a bit weak, but they are still positive at the 10% level for the
collection rate measure and positive at the 5% level for the expenditure and paternity
establishment rate measures.
divorce rate. In our case, it also turns out to be important, especially for the estimations of the total
fertility rate for marital births and the marriage rate. The results without the state-specific time trends
are discussed in Section 2.4.5.
22We also consider the five-year moving average of the measures in Section 2.4.5, in order to check
the robustness of the result.
23See the work of Garfinkel et al (2003), for example.
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2.4.4 Marriage Rate Regression
We also run the same regression for the marriage rate. The increase in the marriage
rate is crucial to identify our story from other alternatives. So we will use this estimate
later to check the model’s performance. As for the regression result, we find significantly
positive effects of CSE (at the 1% level) on the marriage rate for all three CSE measures
as summarized in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.4: First Stage Regressions: The Total Fertility Rate for Non-Marital and
Marital Births
Dependent Non-Marital Marital
Variable Total Fertility Rate Total Fertility Rate
CSE Measures
(3-Year Moving Average)
1) Collection -0.29737∗∗ 0.17234†
(0.07936) (0.09502)
2) Expenditure -0.01548∗∗ 0.00738∗
(0.00258) (0.00313)
3) Paternity -0.04132∗∗ 0.03481∗
(0.01451) (0.01550)
Average Wage -0.00014∗∗ -0.00013∗∗ -0.00012∗∗ -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00009†
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Unemp. Rate 0.00425∗∗ 0.00421∗∗ 0.00592∗∗ -0.00577∗∗ -0.00570∗∗ -0.00116
(0.00128) (0.00126) (0.00139) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00149)
Gender Gap -0.00723 -0.00548 -0.00674 0.00507 0.00398 0.00467
(0.01463) (0.01442) (0.01440) (0.01751) (0.01747) (0.01538)
Frac. Black -0.57926∗∗ -0.59053∗∗ -0.50151∗∗ -0.05292 -0.05067 -0.03460
(0.11592) (0.11432) (0.12300) (0.13878) (0.13850) (0.13138)
Frac. Hisp. -0.25437 -0.23141 0.29846 -1.18736∗∗ -1.19020∗∗ -0.31875
(0.16167) (0.15908) (0.18415) (0.19355) (0.19273) (0.19670)
Frac. HS DP 0.20511∗ 0.16742† 0.12462 0.17183 0.19072 0.18766†
(0.09920) (0.09798) (0.10492) (0.11877) (0.11871) (0.11207)
Max AFDC 0.04237∗∗ 0.04171∗∗ 0.07972∗∗ 0.02951∗∗ 0.03013∗∗ 0.07517∗∗
(0.00370) (0.00359) (0.00555) (0.00443) (0.00434) (0.00593)
Intercept -58.19391∗∗ -56.04314∗∗ -56.52598∗∗ 18.04203∗∗ 16.54161∗∗ 9.01692
(4.96011) (4.75847) (5.45825) (5.93830) (5.76504) (5.83009)
State-Specific
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 908 908 806 908 908 806
R2 0.95963 0.96069 0.96057 0.97126 0.97135 0.97615
F 174.02847 178.92167 155.563 247.45659 248.18175 261.29123
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
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Table 2.5: Marriage Rate Regressions
Dependent Variable Marriage Rate
CSE Measures
(3-Year Moving Average)
1) Collection 0.01315∗∗
(0.00419)
2) Expenditure 0.00061∗∗
(0.00015)
3) Paternity 0.00302∗∗
(0.00076)
Average Wage 0.00018 -0.00025 0.00041†
(0.00024) (0.00023) (0.00023)
Unemp. Rate -0.00047∗∗ -0.00046∗∗ -0.00028∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Gender Gap -0.00211 -0.00186 -0.00014
(0.00226) (0.00224) (0.00228)
Frac. Black 0.00873 0.00853 0.00536
(0.00581) (0.00577) (0.00605)
Frac. Hisp. -0.01984 -0.01995 -0.01791
(0.01275) (0.01266) (0.01317)
Frac. HS DP 0.00148 0.00292 0.00300
(0.00481) (0.00480) (0.00500)
Max AFDC -0.00077∗∗ -0.00074∗∗ 0.00027
(0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00029)
Intercept 2.27407∗∗ 2.16429∗∗ 1.97683∗∗
(0.24523) (0.23862) (0.26663)
State-Specific
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Trends Yes Yes Yes
N 681 681 591
R2 0.96773 0.96814 0.97179
F 180.25471 182.62504 184.0761
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
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2.4.5 First Stage: Checking the Robustness
In this subsection, we briefly talk about the robustness of our first-stage estimation
results. Details are available in Appendix A.2.
Five-Year Moving Average of the CSE Measures
Since we have been taking only three-year moving averages of the CSE measures, it
might be true that the dependent variables react too much to the change in the degree
of CSE in the short term. In the long run, stronger CSE might affect the dependent
variables more modestly. To check if that is true or not, we also consider the five-year
moving averages of the CSE measures and run the same regressions. The results are
summarized in Appendix A.2. As shown there, the five-year moving averages of the
measures increase the effects of stronger CSE on the dependent variables. Therefore,
we conclude that the CSE effects do not disappear even if we consider the longer time
period. (They last for at least 5 years.)
The Regressions without State-Specific Time Trends
Through our first-stage estimation, it turns out that the state-specific time trends, which
we include in our bench-mark regressions, are important to capture the correct effects
of stronger CSE on the dependent variables (In particular, for the marital total fertility
rate and the marriage rate). To emphasize this point, we show the regression results
without the state-specific time trends in Appendix A.2. In those regressions, instead, we
include an aggregate time trend with standard state dummies. As you see in the tables,
the results of the non-marital total fertility do not change signs or significance. However,
the results of the marital total fertility do change signs. And for the marriage rate, the
results become no longer significant. Friedberg (1998) talks about the importance of
state-specific time trends in her divorce rate regression. She reports that the effects
of the divorce law reform on the divorce rate could not be observed without including
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state-specific time trends in the regression. That applies to our analysis as well.
2.4.6 Second Stage: Structural Estimation
Now we turn to the second-stage regression, where we estimate the structural model’s
parameters. In this subsection, we talk about the parameters, the moments to match,
and the estimation procedure in our second-stage estimation.
Parametrization
First, let us assume the following functional forms for utility and child investment
functions.
u(c, a′) + v(nq) = ln(c) + a′ + α ln(nq)
f0(s) = (ι+ s)
η0 , f1(s) = (ι+ s)
η1 0 < η0, η1 < 1.
These functional forms give us five parameters to be estimated, (α, ι, η0, η1, ψ). Also,
we assume that people’s charm is normally distributed, with mean 0 and variance σ2a
for both women and men; a ∼ N(0, σ2a), Then σa is another parameter to be estimated.
Other parameters determined through estimation are δ: utility discount for fathers out
of wedlock, κ: utility value of marriage, and ψ: good cost per child. Then we end up
with eight parameters to be estimated. We list them in Table 2.6. Other parameters in
the model can be exactly identified from the data. Those are summarized in Table 2.7
and discussed below.
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Table 2.6: Parameters to be Estimated in the Second Stage
Name in Model
Uitlity Discount for Fathers out of Wedlock δ
Utility Value of Marriage κ
Variance of People’s Charm σa
Parameter for Utilility Weight α
Parameter for Child Investment Function ι
Parameter for Child Investment Function (Non-Marital) η0
Parameter for Child Investment Function (Marital) η1
Goods Cost per Child ψ
Table 2.7: Exactly Identified Parameters
Name Symbol Value Source
AFDC Benefit (1980) g(e, n) 0.81×(Poverty Threshold) Congressional Green Book
Child Support Order τ cs(n) 0.17 ∼ 0.31 Wisconsin Guideline
Time Cost for Children φ 0.075 De La Crox et al. (2003)
Women’s Mean Wage µfh 2.20
}
Greenwood et al. (2003)Men’s Mean Wage µmh 2.58
Log Var. of Wages σh 0.57
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Eligibility and benefit lev-
els of AFDC vary across states and time periods. In order to simplify this criteria,
we assume that the maximum AFDC benefit is 81% of of the Federal poverty thresh-
old, where the number (81%) comes from the average eligibility criteria across states in
1980.24 We also assume that if a single mother’s income is below the poverty thresh-
old, the portion is compensated by the AFDC benefit, so that her income is equal to
24This data come from the Overview of Entitlement Program: Green Book edited by the U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means.
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the one at the poverty threshold. This poverty threshold is set as 0.27×(Men’s mean
income) calculated from the 1980 data.25 The poverty line increases by 25% every time
a household gets an additional member.
Child Support Order We follow the Wisconsin guideline to determine the eligible
amount of child support. The guideline says 17% of a payer’s income if there is only
one child, 25% for two children, 29% for three children, 31% for four children, and 34%
for five or more.
Time Cost for Children We follow De La Croix and Doepke (2003) to determine
the time cost for children. Based on their calculation, parent spends 7.5% of time per
child in parent’s entire life.
Human Capital Distribution We follow Greenwood et al. (2003) to determine the
human capital distributions for women and men. They assume log-normal distributions
for human capital and match their mean and standard deviation to the wage data.
More precisely, they assume that women’s human capital level hf follows a log-normal
distribution with its parameters µfh = 2.20 and σh = 0.57. For men, they assume the
parameters µmh = 2.58 and σh = 0.57. When computing the model, we discretize those
distributions so that each type has the same number of people as we assumed in Section
2.2.1.
25See the website; http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/.
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Table 2.8: Targeted Values in the Second-Stage Estimation
Name Value Data Source
(1) Regression Coefficient for Non-Marital Births: βS -0.297 First Stage Regression
(2) Regression Coefficient for Marital Births: βM 0.172 First Stage Regression
(3) 1980: Fraction of Non-Marital Births in Total Births 0.162 NVSR (1980)
(4) 1980: Total Fertility Rate 1.887 NVSR (1980)
(5) 1980: Total Educational Expenditure in Cons. Exp. 0.104 U.S. Dept. of Education
(6) 1980: Fertility Ratios Between
Non-Married and Married 0.727 NSFG (1979)
(7) 1980: Educational Investment Ratio Between
Non-Married and Married 2.764 U.S. Bureau of Labor Stat.
(8) 1980: Income Correlation among Married 0.440 CPS (1980)
(9) Fraction of Child’s Consumption
in Married Household with One Child (OECD) 0.147
Moments
Listed in Table 2.8 the eight moments in the second-stage estimation. The seven pa-
rameters are thus over-identified. The regression coefficients for (1) the non-marital and
(2) marital total fertility rates, (βS , βM ), and (3) the fraction of non-marital births are
the most crucial targets, which identify (δ, κ). (4) The total fertility rate, (5) the total
educational expenditure,26 (6) the fertility ratio between the non-married and the mar-
ried, and (7) the educational investment ratio between the non-married and the married
jointly determine the four parameters, (α, ι, η0, η1).
27 (8) The fraction of child’s con-
sumption in married household with one child identifies ψ: good cost per child. (9) The
income correlation among married couples determine σa. In the model, all the statistics
(3) - (9) are calculated in the equilibrium in which CSE γ ≈ 0. That is, assuming
that CSE is very small in 1980, we calculate the model’s counterparts for the pre-CSE
26Digest of Education Statistics, edited by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S.
Department of Education.
27The fertility ratio between the non-married and the married is calculated from the CDC’s National
Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) 1976. The educational investment ratio between the non-married
and the married is calculated from Household Expenditure on Children 2007-2008 in the Monthly Labor
Review, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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targets.
Figure 2.4: Distribution of Child Support Collection Rate, 1980-1997
Second-Stage Estimation Procedure
In the second-stage estimation, we simulate the model, run regressions, and obtain the
model’s counterpart for the regression coefficients (βˆSγ , βˆ
M
γ ). In order to run this simu-
lation, we first need to approximate the distribution of the child support collection rate
in order to draw random policy values {γt}. Figure 2.4 shows such an approximation.
The distribution of the collection rate is replicated by an exponential distribution with
the same mean as in the data. Then we run the second-stage estimation by taking the
following steps.
1. In every loop in the estimation, simulate the policy from the exponential distribu-
tion 908 times, {γt}908t=1. This is the actual number of the state-year observations
in the first-stage regression.
2. Then, given a set of parameters θ, compute the equilibrium for each given γt. In
particular, when computing the equilibrium, we follow the steps below.
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(a) Discretize the spaces for human capital and charm.
(b) After calculating
{
Vˆ fS (Φ, γt), Vˆ
m
S (Φ, γt), Vˆ
f
M (Φ, γt), Vˆ
m
M (Φ, γt)
}
Φ∈F
that are
the utility values for all possible pairs, apply the extended version of Gale and
Shapley’s algorithm as described in Appendix A.1. Compute the distribution
of the pairs in non-marital relationships and marital relationships. Then
calculate the total fertility rate in each relationship.
3. Run the following regressions for the obtained marital and non-marital total fer-
tility rates for each of {γt}908t=1.
Y St = β0 + β
S(θ)γt
YMt = β0 + β
M (θ)γt.
4. Construct other targets, Z(θ), and evaluate the model’s performance by calculat-
ing
m(θ)T ×W ×m(θ)
where m(θ) ≡
(
βˆSγ (θ)− βˆS,Dataγ , βˆMγ (θ)− βˆM,Dataγ , Z(θ)− ZData
)
.
5. Repeat steps 1 - 4 until the set of parameters attains the minimum of the above
objective.
In the computation of the model, we discretize the state space for human capital and
charm using 20 and 5 grids, respectively. Thus, there are 100 types of women and men
in the economy.
2.5 Results
In this section, we talk about our estimation results. We also derive the CSE’s implica-
tions for the next generation’s income distribution.
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2.5.1 Estimation Result
The model’s performance and the estimation result for the parameters are summarized
in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10. In Table 2.9, as you see in the data and model columns, our
model is performing well; it closely matches most of the targets in the data including the
coefficients, βSγ and β
M
γ . One exception is the fraction that educational expenditures
are of the total consumer expenditures. In the data, education is about 10% of total
consumer expenditures, but the model suggests about 20%. One possible explanation
for this difference is the lack of public education in the model. If we include this amount,
the model might perform better.
In the model, men’s increased willingness to marry is the driving force behind the
decrease in non-marital births (βSγ < 0) and the increase in marital births (β
M
γ > 0).
After the strengthening of CSE policies, facing the larger cost per child due to the
mandatory child support payment, men in non-marital relationships may
1. Reduce the number of children and, instead, increase investments in child quality.
2. Reduce the number of children and, instead, increase the private consumption.
3. Get married to avoid the child cost change.
Option (1) is not attractive to unmarried fathers, because to increase a child’s quality
investment they have to transfer money to the mothers. But these transfers involve two
types of inefficiency in our model: First, in non-marital relationships, since the mothers
are not considering the fathers’ utility, they do not invest all the money in children’s
quality. They use some of it for their private consumption. Second, if the mother in a
non-marital relationship is on a welfare program, then the state government takes away
a significant portion of child support payments made by the biological father. Therefore,
fathers’ investments do not really increase a child’s quality. And unmarried fathers are
thus left with options (2) or (3). As a result, men split between reducing the number of
children and increasing marriage when facing the increased degree of CSE. This result
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hinges upon the parameter, δ.
Table 2.9: The Match Between the Model and the Data
Name Data Model
(1) Regression Coefficients for M Births: βSγ -0.297 -0.272
(2) Regression Coefficients for NM Births: βMγ 0.172 0.169
(3) 1980: Fraction of Non-Marital Births in Total Births 0.162 0.170
(4) 1980: Total Fertility Rate 1.887 1.899
(5) 1980: Total Educational Expenditure in Cons. Exp. 0.104 0.182
(6) 1980: Fertility Ratios Between
Non-Married and Married 0.727 0.699
(7) 1980: Educational Investment Ratio Between
Non-Married and Married 2.764 2.566
(8) 1980: Income Correlations among Married 0.440 0.434
(9) Fraction of Child’s Consumption (OECD) 0.147 0.140
Table 2.10: Estimated Parameters
Name Parameter Estimates
Uitlity Discount for Fathers out of Wedlock δ 0.491
Utility Cost of Marriage κ -0.185
Parameter for Utilility Weight α 3.900
Parameter for Child Investment ι 0.814
Parameter for Child Investment (Non-Marital) η0 0.251
Parameter for Child Investment (Marital) η1 0.610
Variance of People’s Charm σa 0.128
Goods Cost per Child ψ 1.125
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2.5.2 Over-Identification: Model’s Performance for Marriage
We check the model’s performance through its prediction for the increase of marriages
after CSE strengthens. We calculate the changes in the number of the ever-married at
age 45 after 10% increase in the collection rate by using the estimated coefficient for the
marriage rate from the previous regression. According to our estimate in Table 2.5, a
10% gain in the collection rate will increase the marriage rate by 0.0013 points. (Using
the 1980’s average marriage rate, 0.042, this turns out to be a 3.1% increase of the
marriage rate) If we calculate the number of the ever-married using the marriage rate
in 1980 and the one after the 10% increase of the collection rate, the change from the
former to the latter is about 1.93%. And, the change in the model is 1.39%. Thus, the
model accounts for 72% of the increase in the ever-married in the data, which implies a
good performance of our model to account for the changes. (See Table 2.11)
Table 2.11: Model’s Performance for the Increase of Marriage
Num of Ever-Married Num of Ever-Married
(Data) (Model)
1980 0.940 0.860
CSE ∆10% 0.958 0.871
Change ∆1.93% ∆1.39%
2.5.3 The Effects of CSE on Child Investment and Individual’s Welfare
Next, we use the model to quantify the effects of CSE on child investment and individ-
ual’s welfare. In 2.12, we calculate the changes in the amount of child investment, the
quality of child, and the number of child after 10% increase in the collection rate. As
found in the table, CSE increases the amount of child investment significantly among
the bottom-income group. This change is driven by the change in people’s marital
status. As more couples start getting married, they pool their income together, and
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access to the better child investment technology, which results in the increase in child
investment.
Table 2.12: The Changes in Child Investment After a 10% Increase in the Collection
Rate
Mother’s Child Investment Child Quality Number of Child
Income Group ∆s ∆q ∆n
Top 0-20 % -∆0.1% -∆0.1% +∆0.0%
20-40 % -∆0.1% -∆0.1% +∆0.0%
40-60 % +∆0.0% +∆0.0% +∆0.0%
60-80 % +∆1.1% +∆0.9% -∆0.5%
80-100 % +∆5.0% +∆4.8% -∆2.0%
Average +∆1.2% +∆1.1% -∆0.5%
Table 2.13 shows the associated changes in the number of the married, and women
and men’s welfare after 10% increase in the collection rate. As shown in the table,
more people start getting married, especially, in the bottom-income group of people.
This is caused by the men’s increased willingness to marry; the mechanism we talk in
the previous sections. And, that change of the increase in marriage is the driving force
behind the increase in child investment.
Table 2.13 shows the changes in individual’s welfare by income level. You will notice
that there are significant transfers of utility from men to women even in the high-income
groups of people. This is because women obtain more consumption within household
after men’s outside option values (the values of being single) decrease. This effect is
not quite strong for women in the bottom-income group since not all the women in that
group get married after 10% increase in the collection rate. Most of those unmarried
52
women are on the welfare program (AFDC), and thus, they cannot enjoy the child
support transfers from men because the government takes them away.
Table 2.13: The Changes in Marriage and Individual’s Welfare After a 10% Increase
in the Collection Rate
Marriage Welfare
Income Group Women Men Women Men
Top 0-20 % -∆0.0% -∆0.0% +∆2.6% -∆2.2%
20-40 % -∆0.0% -∆0.0% +∆2.6% -∆2.2%
40-60 % +∆0.0% +∆0.0% +∆2.7% -∆2.3%
60-80 % +∆2.5% +∆0.0% +∆3.0% -∆2.5%
80-100 % +∆5.0% +∆7.5% +∆1.5% -∆5.1%
Average +∆1.5% +∆1.5% +∆2.5% -∆2.9%
2.5.4 Inter Generational Human Capital Transmission
Finally, we look into the changes in the next generation’s income distribution. Assume
human capital in the next generation is log-normally distributed around child quality.
The conditional mean is µfh|q and µ
m
h|q, and conditional variance, σh|q = σg:
µfh|q = log (1 × q2)
µmh|q = log (1 × q2 + µg) .
To predict the next generation’s income distribution, we first calibrate the parameters
(1, 2, σg, µg) so that (1) human capital distribution in the next generation is the same
as in the previous generation in 1980, and (2) the correlation between son and father’s
income is ρg = 0.73 (Knowles (1999)). Then we use those human capital transmission
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functions to generate the next generation’s income distribution. The calibration result
of (1, 2, σg, µg) is summarized in Appendix A.3.
Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 summarize the result of a 10% increase in the child
support collection rate. Our model predicts that assuming a general human capital
transmission function, the model predicts that the increased collection rate will increase
people’s income, especially, in the bottom group, and decrease the 90-10% income ratio
of the next generation by 3.1%.
Table 2.14: The Changes in Income After a 10% Increase in the Collection Rate
Men’s Income
in the Next Generation
Income Group ∆whm
Top 0-20 % +∆0.0%
20-40 % +∆0.1%
40-60 % +∆1.3%
60-80 % +∆1.7%
80-100 % +∆3.0%
Average +∆1.22%
Table 2.15: The Changes in Income Distribution After a 10% Increase in the Collection
Rate
Name Before After Changes
Men’s 90-10 Income Ratio 1.963 1.904 -∆3.1%
Men’s Gini Coefficient 0.348 0.345 -∆0.8%
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of the strengthened U.S. Child Support
Enforcement policies on people’s marriage and fertility decisions and long-term inequal-
ity. Despite their original purposes, the CSE policies have brought unexpected changes
in people’s marriage and fertility behaviors. Based on our new empirical findings, we
propose a mechanism which accounts for the changes of non-marital births, marital
births, and the marriage rate. We develop a novel stable matching model which fea-
tures the choices of marital or non-marital relationships, and structurally estimate the
model using the CDC’s National Vital Statistics Report Natality data. Our results
show that strengthened CSE increases child investment through secondary effect; the
shift from non-marital births to marital births. And our model predicts that there will
be a significant reduction in the poverty in the next generation through this change.
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Chapter 3
The Blighted Youth: An
International Comparison of
Life-Cycle Unemployment
3.1 Introduction
Across advanced OECD economies, youth unemployment rates are typically at least
double those of adult unemployment rates and are more sensitive to business cycle fluc-
tuations. Bell and Blanchflower (2011), for example, estimate that youth unemployment
rates change 1.79 percentage points for each 1 per cent change in adult rates. The large
negative and long-lasting effects on earnings for young workers of entering the labor
market in a downturn have been well documented (discussed below). In countries like
Spain and Greece, where the unemployment rate for workers of age 15-24 has recently
surpassed 50%, the welfare implications are potentially large.
The purpose of our study is to evaluate the costs of recessions and, in particular,
the long lasting effects on young workers entering the labor market during a downturn1.
1Standard models of search and unemployment, in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) tra-
dition, are not able to generate earnings losses comparable to those found in the data (Davis and von
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To this effect we build an heterogeneous worker life-cycle model of unemployment with
on-the-job human capital accumulation and aggregate productivity shocks2. We are
interested the quantitative role of the tax-wedge and minimum wages in determining
the impact of recessions on unemployment rates across countries.
The quantitative model builds upon the theoretical work of Guido Menzio and
Shouyong Shi (2010a, 2010b, 2011). They develop a framework of directed job search
and free entry of firms. The main advantage of this framework is the nature of the
resulting block recursive equilibrium: value and policy functions of agents are indepen-
dent of the endogenous distribution of workers across individual states (in our version
they will depend on the aggregate state of the economy only through the realization
of the aggregate productivity state). This framework is thus particularly useful due to
its tractability for analyzing the effect of aggregate productivity shocks on the labor
market.
Most closely related to our paper is Menzio et al. (2012). They study a life-cycle
model with on-the-job human capital accumulation, search and learning frictions and use
this theory to decompose the life-cycle profile of wages, transition rates and productivity
into the effects of age variation in work-life expectancy, human capital and match quality.
Our interest is on the interaction of recessions and labor market institutions, the tax-
wedge and minimum wages in particular. Therefore we introduce aggregate productivity
shocks. To consider labor market institutions we modify the wage determination process
from Menzio et al. (2012). In our model the market where a worker decides to search
is indexed by ability, age, human capital and the wage paid in the first period. If the
match is maintained posterior wages are determined through a Nash-bargaining process.
We also extend the model by introducing heterogeneous ability of workers. Huggett,
Wachter, 2011).
2We abstract from welfare losses associated with incomplete markets for risk sharing. Rogerson
and Schindler (2002) asses the welfare costs of the risk of job displacement, associated with large
persistent losses in income. They abstract from heterogeneity in idiosyncratic wage growth (other than
that generated by a displacement shock) and from labor market frictions that affect the outcomes
experienced by workers.
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Ventura and Yaron (2006) exploit a life-cycle model of human capital accumulation to
replicate the age dynamics and cross-sectional properties of the US earnings distribution.
They find that differences in the ability to accumulate human capital are essential to
reproduce an increase in earnings dispersion over the life cycle and that these differences
account for the bulk of the variation in the present value of earnings across agents.
Huggett et al. (2011) find that as of age 23, heterogeneity in initial conditions in terms
of human capital and learning ability (capacity to accumulate human capital) is the main
source of variation in realized lifetime earnings3, as opposed to shocks received over their
lifetime. There is evidence from the literature on recessions and youth unemployment
that low ability young workers suffer larger losses than higher ability young workers.
Furthermore, since these workers will not be able to accumulate human capital, it may
affect the persistence of unemployment rates. Workers with less education typically
have higher unemployment rates and these rates are more sensitive to business cycle
fluctuations.
In our quantitative framework we find that youth unemployment rates are higher
and more sensitive to increments in the tax-wedge relative to total unemployment rates.
We then simulate one time shocks to aggregate productivity and compare the evolution
of unemployment rates in economies with different tax-wedges. We provide estimates
of losses in terms of present discounted value of earnings to young workers in different
aggregate states of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the literature
on the impact of recessions on young workers entering the labor market, Section 3.3
provides a brief overview on the empirical evidence and theoretical work on different
institutions and policies and labor market outcomes, Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 describe
3Their choice of age is given by the observation that many people will have finished formal schooling.
We note that the literature that estimates the impact of youth unemployment on lifetime/long-term
earnings considers the range 16/18 to 25 (discussed below). Huggett et al. (2011) calibrate the initial
conditions in terms of human capital as exogenous. Admittedly, as those authors recognize, pushing
back the age will raise the issue of the importance of one’s family or, more broadly, one’s environment.
We leave that as a topic for further research.
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our theoretical framework and the nature of the block recursive equilibrium, Section 3.6
consists of a discussion of the parameters as well as the quantitative analysis of the
model, Section 3.7 concludes with final comments.
3.2 The Long-Term Impact of Recessions on Youth
Entering the labor market during a recession has a large negative and persistent impact
on the labor earnings of the young4. Unemployment generates a direct loss of income
but there are additional large and long lasting effects that represent costs above the
direct cost. The literature is too vast for a complete review, but a set of the main
results is presented, with a focus on the evidence for advanced OECD economies5.
The general consensus is that an unemployment spell consistently imposes a persis-
tent wage scar upon individuals both in terms of income and posterior unemployment
spells (Arumpalam, 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2005). It is also known that recessions
are associated with relatively large increases in unemployment for the young and those
with low education (Genda et al., 2010; Bell and Blanchflower, 2011).
Although not focusing on recessions, Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) estimate the long-
term costs of job displacement for young adults: five years after a job loss the shortfall
in annual earnings is 9% lower for men relative to what would have been expected
absent the job loss. For older workers total losses largely represent immediate earnings
losses whereas for young workers the loss of opportunities for rapid earnings growth
is more important (they find that young displaced workers do not experience a large
decline in earnings following displacement). For young workers, substantial costs may
be associated with job displacement in the form of missed or delayed opportunities to
4Youth is defined as age over the minimum school-leaving age (typically 16-18 for OECD countries)
and less than 25 (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011).
5We abstain from comparing these estimations across countries. The wide differences in labor market
institutions, educational systems, demographic environments, data availability and applied methodolo-
gies make any attempt to compare the estimates an uninteresting exercise (this is a point already made
in the literature). A discussion of the statistical techniques employed in the literature is outside the
scope of this paper.
59
accumulate human capital.
Kahn (2010) analyzes the labor market experience of those graduating from college
as a function of macroeconomic conditions in the US. She estimates an initial wage loss
of 6-7% for a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate measure and even
15 years after college graduation the loss is 2.5% and statistically significant.
Table 3.1: The Long-Term Impact of Recessions on Youth
country earn. loss period/lag exercise (shock)
Austria 6.5% accumulated 1 p.p. unemp. rate increase
Canada 5% accumulated 5 p.p. unemp. rate increase
Japan 5-7% 12 yrs. later 1 p.p. unemp. rate increase
USA 2.5% 15 yrs. later 1 p.p. unemp. rate increase
Sweden 17% 5 yrs. later 50 days youth unemployment
UK 10% at age 42 6 months+ of youth unemp.
Source: Brunner and Kuhn (Austria, 2010), Oreopoulos et al.
(Canada, 2012), Genda et al. (Japan, 2010), Nordstro¨m Skans
(Sweden, 2004), Gregg and Tominey (UK, 2005), Kahn (2010, USA).
For Canada, Oreopoulos et al. (2012), also considering those graduating from college,
estimate that a rise in unemployment rates by 5 percentage points implies an initial loss
in earnings of about 9 percent that halves within 5 years and finally fades to zero after
10 years. The role of heterogeneity is also emphasized: advantaged graduates (at the
top of the wage distribution) suffer less as they recover within 2-4 years through a
process of mobility towards better firms, while earnings of less advantaged graduates
can be permanently affected by cyclical downgrading. The least advantaged suffer a loss
of 8 percent of cumulative earnings in their first 10 years, double those of the median
graduate. The effects of a recession are strongest for young workers, relative to workers
with more experience.
For Austria, Brunner and Kuhn (2010) estimate the effects of labor market entry
conditions on wages of males entering the labor market and find that a one percentage
point increase in the initial local unemployment rate is associated with an approximate
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shortfall in lifetime earnings of 6.5 percent (average of the accumulated wage losses
within the first 20 years of labor market experience). For Japan, Genda et al. (2010)
estimate that a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate at entry reduces the
likelihood of being employed by 3-4 percentage points for over 12 years. The same event
leads to earnings losses of 5-7% for over 12 years for those without college education.
Moreover, a recession at the time of entry not only lowers annual earnings but also raises
the likelihood of nonemployment and part-time employment for the less educated. A
considerable part of the negative on earnings is the effect through lower likelihood of
regular stable employment.
For the UK, Gregg and Tominey (2005) estimate the scar from early unemployment
to be approximately 10% at age 42 for having over 6 months of youth unemployment
if individuals avoid repeat exposure to unemployment. The negative impact is approx-
imately twice as large if the effect on repeated unemployment is taken into account.
Early individual unemployment experiences significantly raise the propensity to adult
unemployment (see also Gregg, 2001). The role of heterogeneity is emphasized (see also
Burgess et al., 2003). The literature in general stresses the importance of heteorgeneity6
associated with education and ability of the young workers. Individuals securing bet-
ter qualifications on leaving full-time education are less prone to youth unemployment.
This suggests that education can help youths recover from early unemployment but it
is not commonly undertaken.
For Sweden, Nordstro¨m Skans (2004) estimate that 50 days of unemployment in the
year following high school graduation leads to a 3 percentage points higher probability
to experience a similar period of unemployment and a decrease in total annual earnings
of 17% 5 years later. In Norway, Raaum and Røed (2006) find that individuals who face
depressed local labor markets (6% local unemployment rate vs. 1%) when they graduate
from secondary education, are subject to relatively high rates of non-employment during
6This is not without econometric challenges: identifying causal effects of past unemployment is a
difficult task due to unobserved heterogeneity.
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their whole prime-age work career.
The severity of long term income losses depend on the business cycle: Davis and von
Wachter (2011) estimate that in present value terms men lose on average 1.4 years of pre-
displacement earnings if displaced in mass-layoffs events that occur when the national
unemployment rate is below 6 percent. This loss doubles to 2.8 years of pre-displacement
earnings if the event occurs when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 percent.
A number of theories can potentially predict persistent negative effects from un-
employment (see Gregg and Tominey, 2005). An unemployment spell can lead to the
depreciation of general skills7 and the loss of firm specific skills. For those entering the
labor market, time without a job is time forgone in terms of human capital accumula-
tion. Theories of on-the-job search will predict that displacement from a high quality
match implies a higher probability of return to a low quality position. Therefore, losses
may not solely be due to human capital depreciation. For young workers, mobility plays
an important role as it contributes to early wage growth8. Theories of screening have
also been considered as mechanisms that are able to generate persistent income losses
from unemployment. Michaud (2012) provides a theory of information and labor mar-
kets with search and matching to account for persistent wage losses of laid-off workers.
In this set-up employer uncertainty about unemployed workers’ abilities can account for
71% of the long-term wage losses following a lay-off.
We note also that some of these studies estimate the losses suffered by individuals
who had unemployment spells, while others refer to losses for those entering the labor
market in a downturn but did not experience unemployment. The main channel consid-
ered in our theory is through on-the-job human capital accumulation and depreciation.
In a recession, youth unemployment rates are higher. Young workers without a job
7More generally, unemployment spells are also associated with declines in health and general well-
being (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011; Davis and von Wachter, 2011).
8There is a sizable literature analyzing the sources of life-cycle wage growth. To mention a recent
example, Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2013) construct and estimate an equilibrium job
search model with human capital accumulation, employer heterogeneity and individual level shocks.
Career wage growth is decomposed into the contributions of human capital and job search: typically
considered the two main driving forces of the earnings/experience profile.
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are unable to accumulate human capital, affecting their long term income prospects.
Additionally, workers that lose their jobs lose a part of their human capital.
3.3 Policies and Labor Markets
This section provides brief overviews of recent empirical evidence and theoretical work,
with a focus on OECD economies.9
Table 3.2: Unemployment Rate Equations
total (male) youth (male)
tax wedge 0.28∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
union density -0.06∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.04
employment protection -0.55∗ -0.50 0.51 -0.38
high corporatism -1.14∗∗∗ -1.43∗∗∗ -1.17 -1.73∗∗
avg. replacement rate 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.08∗
output gap -0.50∗∗∗ − -0.98∗∗∗ −
tfp shock − -10.99∗∗∗ − -27.44∗∗∗
terms of trade − 18.51∗∗∗ − 33.86∗∗∗
interest rate − 0.16∗∗∗ − 0.26∗∗∗
labor demand − 17.60∗∗∗ − 33.87∗∗∗
country controls yes yes yes yes
time controls yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.89
n. observations 405 372 404 371
Stat. significance: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006), World Development Indicators.
The tax wedge is defined as the difference between the gross labor costs to employers
and the consumption wage paid to employers, i.e. the wage after deduction of direct and
indirect taxes, including payroll taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes (Addison
9Addison and Teixeira (2001) survey the literature on the labor market consequences of employment
protection legislation. They conclude that the preponderance of the studies support the hypothesis that
stricter employment protection rules result in lower employment-population ratios. There is, however,
no consensus with respect to the effect on unemployment rates. See also Bassanini and Duval (2006)
and Nickell et al. (2005). The ambiguous impact of firing costs is also found in the theoretical literature
(see Ljungqvist, 2002).
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and Teixeira, 2001). Nickell et al. (2005) estimate that a 10 percentage point increase
in total employment tax rate leads to approximately a 1 percentage point increase in
unemployment in the long run. They also find that changes in labor market institutions
explain approximately 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the 1960s to
the first half of the 1990s, much of the remainder being due to the deep recession in the
latter period. They estimate that changes in the benefit system and increases in labor
taxes contribute the most to the increase of 6.8 percentage points in unemployment in
this period: the combination of benefits and taxes are responsible for two thirds of the
part of the long-term rise in European unemployment that the considered institutions
explain (see also Nickell and Layard, 1999).
In line with these findings, Bassanini and Duval (2006) estimate that changes in labor
market institutions can account for two-thirds of non-cyclical unemployment changes
in OECD countries. In particular, they estimate that a 10 percentage point reduction
in the tax wedge would be associated with a drop in the unemployment rate by 2.8
percentage points. They also conclude that the level and duration of unemployment
benefits have a significantly positive impact on unemployment. We re-estimate their
specifications using male unemployment rates. For a 10 percent point reduction in the
tax wedge the total male unemployment rate increases by 2.1-2.8 percentage points,
the youth unemployment rate increases by 3.4-4.5 percentage points (Table 3.2). Youth
unemployment rates are more sensitive to different types of macroeconomic shocks.
There is work examining the interaction of labor market institutions with the busi-
ness cycle. Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012b). estimate a large negative impact of financial
crises on unemployment, finding that the effect is less pronounced in the short-run
(generally less than or equal to 2-3 years) but more persistent in countries with more
rigid labor market institutions. The effects are larger for youth unemployment. It is
often found that unemployment for youth is more sensitive to labor market institutions.
Nickell and Layard (1999) argue that minimum wages are likely to have a significant
impact on the unemployment rate of low skill and young workers.
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In terms of theoretical work, Prescott (2004) uses a neoclassical growth model with
a stand-in household to argue that variations in tax rates account for most differences
in labor supply in advanced G7 economies. Ohanian, Raffo and Rogerson (2008), also
exploiting a neoclassical growth model, confirm that taxes can account for a large pro-
portion of cross-country differences and variation in hours worked (the product of to-
tal civilian employment and annual hours per worker) for a set of OECD countries.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) examine the previous analysis and emphasize the role
of differences in unemployment benefits rather than tax rates to explain cross-country
differences in employment.10
3.4 Baseline Environment
In this section we describe the theoretical framework without permanent heterogeneous
ability to avoid cumbersome notation11. The framework consists of a life-cycle model
with on-the-job human capital accumulation. There are frictional labor markets with
search and matching. Search is directed and markets are labeled by age of the worker,
human capital and the first period payment to the worker. After the first period,
wages are determined through a Nash-bargaining process. There are aggregate and
idiosyncratic (match-specific) productivity shocks.
3.4.1 Demographics
• There is continuum of workers of measure normalized to one, uniformly distributed
across overlapping generations with age t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Each worker is endowed
with one indivisible unit of labor.
10The role of segmented/two-tier labor markets has also been analyzed, see Blanchard and Landier
(2002) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002).
11Introducing this dimension is straightforward, as it amounts to solving for the block recursive
equilibrium for the different types of ex-ante heterogeneous workers. With that extension markets are
also indexed by ability of the worker.
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• The mass of entering (newly born) workers is equal to 1/T which equals the mass
of retiring/dying workers.
• There is a continuum of firms with positive measure (continuum of potential firms
having infinite mass).
3.4.2 Preferences and Technology
• We assume risk neutrality for both workers and firms and a common discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1).
• Stochastic shocks: aggregate productivity is denoted y ∈ Y with AR(1) process
Λ(y′ | y) and match idiosyncratic productivity z ∈ Z with AR(1) process denoted
Λ(z′ | z), we may also write s = (z, y) and Λ(s′ | s) as the joint process (this allows
for more general joint stochastic processes).
• The human capital of the worker is h ∈ R+, which evolves according to the law
of motion h′ = h + 1 for the periods during which the worker is employed and
remains fixed when the worker is not employed. There is an initial level of human
capital h for all newborn workers. When a match between a worker and a firm is
destroyed, human capital depreciates to µ(h), with lower bound at h. The upper
bound on human capital is h, with h ≤ T .
• Production is carried out in a match between a firm and a worker with production
technology f(y, z, h).
3.4.3 Markets
• There is continuum of markets labeled by (w, h, t, y) ∈ R+ × N3 where firms
commit to pay w for the first period of the match to a worker with (h, t).
• After the initial period the wage is determined through Nash-bargaining when the
worker has no alternative job offer. We assume the worker accepts an offer in the
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market he has chosen to search12.
• The measure of unemployed workers is written as u(h, t) where u : N2 → R+, the
measure of employed workers is e(z, h, t) where e : Z ×N2 → R+. The aggregate
state vector is then ψ = (u, e, y).
• The tightness for a labor market with (w, h, t) is denoted θt(w, h, ψ).
3.4.4 Timing
For the rest of this section we assume that a block recursive equilibrium exists and omit
ψ from the vector of state variables, the aggregate shock y does remain as a relevant
aggregate state variable. The existence of the block recursive equilibrium is proven by
construction in the appendix, following the methodology of Menzio et al. (2012) for a
life cycle economy with directed search and free-entry of firms (adapted to introduce
our extensions). The timing within a period is as follows:
• Entry-and-Exit of Workers, Aggregate Shock. At the beginning of the
period newly born workers enter the market and workers of age T + 1 retire and
die. The aggregate productivity shock y is revealed.
• Search and Matching. The unemployed workers search for a job with prob-
ability λu, while employed workers are allowed to search for an alternative job
with probability λe. A firm opens a vacancy after paying vacancy cost cv. A
worker in market (w, h, t, y) meets a vacancy with probability p(θt(w, h, y)) where
p : R+ → [0, 1] is a twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave function with p(0) = 0 and p(∞)=1. A vacancy in market (w, h, t, y)
meets a worker with probability q(θt(w, h, y)) where q : R+ → [0, 1] is a twice-
differentiable, strictly decreasing function and with q(θ) = p(θ)/θ, q(0) = 1 and
12At the bargaining stage the idiosyncratic productivity level available for production for a potential
new match is known but not the value that will be effective for production at the existing match in that
same period.
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q(∞)=0.
• Wage Determination. When the worker meets a new firm, the firm pays the
initial posted w in the first period. If the worker is matched with no alternative job
offers, the wage is determined through Nash-bargaining with the current firm. If
no agreement is reached, the match is destroyed. The unemployed worker accepts
the offer he receives (if any), otherwise produces and consumes b.
• Production. The idiosyncratic productivity state at the beginning of the period
is z, at the production stage the new idiosyncratic shock z′ is revealed (for new
matches it is known in advance13 and equal to z). The match produces f(y, z′, h).
The accumulation of human capital takes place with production: a matched worker
that enters the period and produces with human capital h, is endowed with human
capital h′ = h+ 1 immediately after production takes place. The matched worker
gets paid and his consumption takes place.
• Exogenous Separation. There is a probability δ of a shock that destroys the
match (exogenous job destruction).
3.4.5 Value of the Worker
Let’s consider in parts the problem of the unemployed worker before the search stage.
With probability λu the unemployed individual has the possibility of searching, if suc-
cessful receives wage wu and enters next period as an employed worker with probability
1− δ. This part of the value of the unemployed worker is given by:
λu p(θt(w
u, h, y))
{
wu + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) ((1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′))}
All new matches produce with idiosyncratic productivity value z in their first period
of existence, it will also be the state value at the beginning of the following period.
13We may set z equal to any value z ∈ Z.
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The unemployed worker may remain unemployed for two reasons: he was not given a
chance to search for a job, or was unsuccessful in his search. In this case, he produces
and consumes b today and enters the next period with unemployment status, with
unchanged level of human capital at age t+ 1. This component can be written as:
(1− λu p( · ))
{
b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ut+1(h, y′)
}
We can write the beginning-of-the-period value of unemployment as:
Ut(h, y) = max{wu}
b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)
{
Ut+1(h, y
′) + λu p(θt(wu, h, y))Sut (w
u, h, y′)
}
where Sut (w
u, h, y′) summarizes the gain for the worker of finding a match:
Sut (w
u, h, y′) =
[
wu − b
β
+ (1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′)− Ut+1(h, y′)
]
Vt+1 is the beginning of the period value of the matched worker (after the aggregate
shock is revealed). The policy function of the unemployed worker is wut (h, y).
A matched worker may be given a chance to search for an alternative job offer
with probability λe, if successful he receives the posted wage of the corresponding labor
market and enters the next period as a matched worker with probability 1 − δ, this
possibility can be written as:
λe p(θt(w
a, h, y))
{
wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) ((1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′))}
If the currently matched worker does not receive an alternative job offer:
(1− λe p( · ))V bt (h, z, y)
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where the wage in V bt (h, z, y) is determined through Nash-bargaining. The value func-
tion is then:
Vt(h, z, y) =λe p( · )
{
wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) ((1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′))}
+ (1− λe p( · ))V bt (h, z, y)
The policy function for a matched worker is denoted wat (h, z, y). Before discussing
how this value is determined through the bargaining process it will be useful to describe
the problem of the firm.
3.4.6 Value of the Firm
At the beginning of the period, when the aggregate shock is revealed, the value of
a currently matched firm is Ft(h, z, y). After the search stage there are two possible
situations, with probability λe p(θt(w
a, h, y)) the worker has found an alternative job
offer and the previous match is destroyed. If the worker has no alternative job offer the
new value of the firm is determined at the bargaining stage F bt (h, z, y). We can then
write the beginning-of-the-period value of the firm as:
Ft(h, z, y) = (1− λe p(θt(wa, h, y)))F bt (h, z, y)
The value of a newly matched firm is Gt(w
a, h, z, y):
Gt(w
a, h, z, y) = f(y, z, h)− wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ft+1(h′, z, y′),
We turn next to the bargaining stage.
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3.4.7 Determination of Wages
If the worker was unsuccessful in obtaining an alternative offer (whether because he
did not have the possibility of searching, or was not successful in the search stage), his
outside option is (human capital depreciates if the match is destroyed):
b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ut+1(µ(h), y′)
while reaching an agreement with the current employer gives (before z′ is revealed):
wb + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z′, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′)
}
For the firm, at the bargaining stage the outside value is zero. The value of main-
taining the match is:
F bt (h, z, y) = −wb +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)Ft+1(h′, z′, y′)
}
Note that current period production takes place with productivity value z′ and y.
There is a cutoff function zbt (h, y), the lowest level of the idiosyncratic productivity shock
such that the joint surplus of the match is non-negative. Given these values, worker
and firm bargain over the wage, through a Nash-bargaining process where the worker
has bargaining power ξ (see Appendix). Finally FT+1 = 0, UT+1 = 0 and VT+1 = 0.
3.4.8 New Vacancies and Free Entry Condition
To close the model we specify the free entry condition of firms. The cost of a vacancy
is cv, in equilibrium the following condition has to hold:
cv ≥ q(θt(w, h, y))
{
f(y, z, h)− w + β (1− δ)
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ft+1(h′, z, y′)
}
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and θt(w, h, y) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
3.5 Block Recursive Equilibrium
Definition. A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of value functions Ut for
unemployed workers, Vt for employed workers, Ft for previously matched firms andGt for
newly matched firms, policy functions wut for unemployed workers and w
a
t for employed
workers, a bargained wage function wbt determined between an employed worker and a
firm, a cutoff productivity function zbt , and a tightness function θt for t = 1, ..., T such
that (i) Ut, Vt, Ft, Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt depend on ψ only through y for t = 1, ..., T ,
(ii) Ft, Gt and θt are consistent with the firm’s rationality and the free-entry condition
for t = 1, ..., T , (iii) Ut and w
u
t solve the unemployed worker’s problem for t = 1, ..., T ,
(iv) Vt and w
a
t solve the employed worker’s problem for t = 1, ..., T , and (v) w
b
t and z
b
t
solve the bargaining problem between an employed worker and a firm for t = 1, ..., T .
Theorem. A recursive equilibrium exists and is block recursive and unique.
The proof is in the appendix for the case without human capital depreciation (the
extension is straightforward). To gain some intuition on this result first consider the
assumption of directed search. Markets are indexed by age and human capital of the
worker (and ability when this extension is considered). Thus, a firm opening a vacancy
in a particular market will know the characteristics of the worker that it will potentially
find. If search was not directed, to calculate the expected discounted profits of open-
ing a vacancy the firm would need to know the distribution of workers with different
characteristics (for example, human capital determines in part the productivity of the
match).
In the market that the workers searches for a job the number of vacancies will adjust
so that the free-entry condition holds for the firms. There are different pairs of first-
period wages and market tightness that could deliver zero expected discounted profits
for firms. The additional condition that determines this pair in equilibrium is a concave
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maximization search problem for each particular type of worker. In the last period of
the worker, it is straightforward to verify that all value and policy functions as well
as bargained wages are independent of the distribution of workers over their individual
state variables. By backward induction a block recursive equilibrium can be constructed.
3.6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we describe the specification employed for the different functions of the
model, the calibration strategies and standard parameters employed in the literature.
We then simulate the economy to evaluate the role of the tax-wedge on unemployment
rates.
3.6.1 Baseline Parameters and Function Specifications
We modify the production function of Menzio et al. (2012), by considering an AR(1)
process for idiosyncratic productivity shocks, AR(1) process for aggregate productivity,
heterogeneous ability of workers. The production function is:
f(a, y, z, h) = a ez+y hγ
where a is the permanent ability of the individual, z is the match-idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock, y is the aggregate productivity shock, γ determines curvature with respect
to human capital in the production function.
• A time period is one month and β ∈ [0.996, 0.9967] is typically calibrated so that
the annual real interest rate is equal to 4-5 percent.
• Bargaining power is equal for firms and workers, ξ = 1/2.
• We set the home production parameter b to target a total average unemployment
rate of 6.5 percent. The vacancy cost is set to 10.42 times the value of home
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production following Menzio et al. (2012).
• In the case with no initial heterogeneity a = 1, with heterogeneity a ∈ {0.9, 1.0, 1.1}
with weights {0.25, 0.50, 0.25}, respectively. The range of human capital is from
h = 1 to h (set to match the peak of mean earnings, Huggett et al., 2006).
The function for human capital depreciation is the grid approximation to µ(h) =
h/(1.08).
Table 3.3: Parameters
parameter description par. value
discount factor β 0.996
periods of life T 40× 12
vacancy cost cv 10.42× b
production - curvature γ 0.06
human capital range h 25× 12
human capital depreciation µ(h) h/(1.08)
exogenous destruction δ 0.01
unemployed search prob. λu 1.00
on-the-job search prob. λe 0.80
matching function p(θ) min{θ1/2, 1}
aggregate process autocorrelation ρy 0.90
aggregate process volatility σy 0.01
idiosyncratic process autocorrelation ρz 0.00
idiosyncratic process volatility σz 0.12
bargaining parameter ξ 1/2
Parameters related to probabilities and distributions:
• For the aggregate productivity process Λ(y′ | y), considering a quarterly time pe-
riod, Den Haan et al. (2000) utilize an autocorrelation14 of 0.95 and standard
deviation 0.007. Pries (2008), in a monthly model, selects the autocorrelation
14We apply the Rouwenhorst method of approximating a stationary AR(1) process following Kopecky
and Suen (2010), this method is found to be reliable relative to other methods in approximating highly
persistent processes.
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and the standard deviation process to target quarterly US data on real average
output per worker in the non-farm business sector, with autocorrelation of 0.878
and standard deviation of 0.02.
• For the idiosyncratic productivity process, Den Haan et al. (2000) consider an
iid shock with standard deviation equal to 0.101. Bils et al. (2011) consider a
persistence of idiosyncratic productivity of 0.97 and a standard deviation of 0.13.
The initial idiosyncratic productivity level for new matches is set to the highest
idiosyncratic productivity level.
• For long-term employment relationships, quarterly US worker separation rates lie
in the range 8-10 percent (Den Haan et al , 2000; pg. 490). Den Haan et al.
(2000) consider a 10 percent rate of total separation (see also Pries, 2008), with
an exogenous separation rate of 0.068. We consider exogenous job destruction
and the possibility of endogenous job destruction. In Menzio and Shi (2011) the
exogenous destruction rate is δ ∈ {0.012, 0.026}.
• λe determines the rate of transition to new jobs, λu governs the rate of transition
from unemployment to employment. In Menzio and Shi (2011) λe ∈ {0.735, 0.904}.
3.6.2 Business Cycle Simulations
We conduct simulations to learn about the impact of the tax-wedge and the role of
heterogeneity in the ability of workers. The benchmark tax wedge is 0.344.15 In the
case of no heterogeneity, for example, increasing the tax wedge by 5 p.p. increases the
unemployment rate from 0.065 to 0.079.
15The OECD definition of the total tax wedge: combined central and sub-central government income
tax plus employee and employer social security contribution taxes, as a percentage of labour costs defined
as gross wage earnings plus employer social security contributions. For the US the total tax wedge is
34.4%.
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Table 3.4: Business Cycle Simulations: No Heterogeneity
average τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.094 0.114 0.164
prime unemployment 0.059 0.071 0.102
total unemployment 0.065 0.079 0.115
volatility τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.037 0.039 0.039
prime unemployment 0.036 0.048 0.058
total unemployment 0.026 0.041 0.050
The unemployment rate for workers of age 21-25 is always higher16 compared to the
unemployment rate for those aged 35-45 and the total unemployment rate. The tax
wedge increases the volatility of unemployment rates in the case of no heterogeneity,
but the effect is not monotonic in a version of the model with ex-ante heterogeneity.17
Table 3.5: Business Cycle Simulations: With Heterogeneity
average τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.093 0.118 0.343
prime unemployment 0.058 0.073 0.294
total unemployment 0.065 0.082 0.305
volatility τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.039 0.046 0.016
prime unemployment 0.042 0.052 0.011
total unemployment 0.032 0.045 0.010
16Individuals enter the market unemployed at age 20, we give them one year to find a job (12 oppor-
tunities) and consider age 21-25 for youth unemployment.
17For the computation of volatility, we first take the natural log of the series, then remove the Hodrick-
Prescott trend with a filter parameter of 105 (see Pries, 2005).
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Figure 3.1: Simulation of a Recession
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3.6.3 Simulations of a Recession
In this section we simulate two economies, one with a tax wedge of 0.344 and an-
other economy with a tax wedge 10 percentage points higher, equal to 0.444. In both
economies the aggregate productivity shock permanently falls from the highest to lowest
possible state. In the high tax-wedge economy, the starting difference between youth
and total unemployment is larger compared to the low tax-wedge economy and is more
amplified by a recession.
3.6.4 Losses due to Unemployment in Present Discounted Values
In this final quantitative section we compute the expected present discounted losses
in labor earnings caused by unemployment. The graphs below show the ratio of the
expected present discounted value of labor earnings of an employed worker of a particular
age (in months starting at 20 years old), relative to the expected present discounted value
of labor earnings for an individual of the same age that lost his job and whose human
capital depreciated accordingly.18 The graphs show this ratio for different ages and in
5 different states of the aggregate productivity (5 is the highest aggregate productivity
and 1 is the lowest). The main results are that losses are bigger: (1) in worse aggregate
states of the economy, (2) for younger individuals, (3) in the economy with the higher
tax wedge. Additionally, in a version of the model with ex-ante heterogeneity, the losses
are larger for low ability individuals.
18See the appendix for a mathematical derivation of the expected present discounted value of labor
earnings.
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Figure 3.2: Losses due to Unemployment
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3.7 Final Comments
Recessions generate sizable losses for young workers entering the labor force. Unem-
ployment generates a direct income loss but also a fall in future income attributed to
foregone human capital accumulation. We analyze a life-cycle model of workers with
heterogeneous ability and on-the-job human capital accumulation and depreciation due
to job loss19. We find that unemployment rates of young workers are typically higher
and more sensitive to the tax-wedge, consistent with the empirical estimates. Long-term
earnings losses generated by match destruction are bigger: (1) in worse aggregate states
of the economy, (2) for younger individuals, (3) in the economy with the higher tax
wedge, (4) for ex-ante low ability individuals.
19This depreciation may be due to firm-specific or occupation-specific human capital. Kambourov
and Manovskii (2009) find that when occupational experience is taken into account, tenure in a certain
industry or a particular employer has quantitatively little importance in accounting for wages. This
evidence could be interpreted as contrary to information theories of wage formation where employer
learn about the productivity of their workers. Occupation specific human capital is transferable across
employers.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Stable Matching Equilibrium
A.1.1 Gale and Shapley Algorithm
After women and men enter the marriage market, their marital status is determined
in a stable pair of matchings (µS , µM ). Here, we describe how to compute such a pair
of matchings by applying the Gale and Shapley (1962) algorithm. As we have said,
we are going to focus on a M -optimal stable matching equilibrium. But, with a small
change, the method can be also applied for a W -optimal equilibrium. To begin with,
we have the following lemma, which is easily derived from the participation constraints
of marriage problem.
Lemma A.1. ∀i ∈ If ,∀j ∈ Im,
Vˆ fM (h
f
i , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ) ≥ Vˆ fS (hfi , afi , hmj , amj , γ),
⇐⇒
Vˆ mM (h
f
i , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ) ≥ Vˆ mS (hfi , afi , hmj , amj , γ).
Now we consider the situation in which each male proposes to a female in a given round,
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say the n-th round. Let λ(j) = 1 if a type-j male is tentatively matched with a partner
from the previous round, and λ(j) = 0 if he is not matched at the beginning of the n-th
round.
1. In the n-th round, if λ(j) = 0, then a type-j male proposes to a type-i fe-
male with a relationship R ∈ {S,M}, who gives him the highest utility value
Vˆ mR (h
f
i , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ) among the females who have never received his proposal
(ρ(i, j) = 0).
2. Each woman accepts the proposal which gives her the highest Vˆ fR (h
f
i , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ)
among the proposals which she received in the n-th round plus the one she carried
over from the previous round. The selected male changes his status to λ(j) = 1.
All other rejected males (these might include her partner from the previous round)
change their status to λ(j) = 1. All the males j′ ∈ Im who newly proposed to her
change their status to ρ(i, j) = 1.
3. Go back to step 1 until ∀j ∈ Im, λ(j) = 1.
Here unlike in the original Gale and Shapley algorithm, men choose a type of relationship
(marriage or a non-marital relationship) every time they make an offer. Also, Lemma
A.1 assures that a woman doesn’t have incentives to reject the highest offer she receives.1
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We will show that a pair of matchings (µS , µM ) obtained through the above al-
gorithm always satisfies the two conditions in Definition 2. Since condition 1 holds obvi-
ously, we will only check whether the condition 2 holds or not. Suppose, to the contrary,
that within the matchings (µS , µM ), there exist a pair of couples (i, µR(i)),(µR′(j), j),
1If Lemma A.1 doesn’t hold, then, women might have strategic motives to reject the offer which
gives her the highest utility value among those she receives in the current round.
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and relationships R,R′, R′′ ∈ {S,M} such that
Vˆ fR′′
(
hfi , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ
)
> Vˆ fR
(
hfi , a
f
i , h
m
µR(i)
, amµR(i), γ
)
,
Vˆ mR′′
(
hfi , a
f
i , h
m
j , a
m
j , γ
)
> Vˆ mR′
(
hfµR′ (j)
, afµR′ (j)
, hmj , a
m
j , γ
)
.
Then one of the following two must be true: (1) type-j male didn’t propose to a type-i
female when she gave the highest utility value among available mates, or (2) a type-i
female didn’t accept a type-j male’s offer when he gave her the highest utility value
among the offers she received. Both of these contradict the algorithm described above.
A.1.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We will show that a pair of matchings (µS , µM ) obtained through the above
algorithm is the unique M -optimal pair. In particular, we will prove that in the above
algorithm, no man is ever rejected by an achievable woman. Consequently, the stable
pair of matchings (µS , µM ) that is produced in the above algorithm matches each man
to his most preferred achievable woman, and is, therefore, the unique M -optimal stable
pair of matchings. This proof is based on the work of Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
The proof is by induction. Assume that up to a given step in the procedure no man
has yet been rejected by a woman who is achievable for him. At this step, suppose
woman i rejects man j. If she rejects j in favor of man j′, whom she keeps engaged,
then she prefers j′ to j. Then we must show that i is not achievable for j.
We know j′ prefers i to any women except for those who have previously rejected him
and hence (by inductive assumption) are unachievable for him. Consider a hypothetical
pair of matchings (µ′S , µ
′
M ) that matches j to i and everyone else to an achievable
partner. Then j′ prefers i to his partner at (µ′S , µ
′
M ). So, the pair (µ
′
S , µ
′
M ) is unstable,
since it is blocked by j′ and i, who each prefer the other to their partner at (µ′S , µ
′
M ).
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Therefore, there is no stable matching that matches i and j, and so they are unachievable
for each other, which completes the proof.
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A.2 Robustness of First-Stage Estimatation
Table A.1: First Stage Regressions: Total Fertility Rate for Non-Marital and Marital
Births with the 5-Years Moving Average of the CSE Measures
Dependent Non-Marital Marital
Variable Total Fertility Rate Total Fertility Rate
CSE Measures
(5-Year Moving Average)
1) Collection -0.46814∗∗ 0.39790∗∗
(0.09619) (0.10756)
2) Expenditure -0.01813∗∗ 0.01962∗∗
(0.00345) (0.00383)
3) Paternity -0.08773∗∗ 0.03272
(0.02273) (0.02242)
Average Wage -0.01403∗∗ -0.01301∗∗ -0.01501∗∗ -0.00663 -0.00713 -0.00724
(0.00419) (0.00415) (0.00466) (0.00468) (0.00462) (0.00460)
Unemp. Rate 0.00633∗∗ 0.00578∗∗ 0.00863∗∗ -0.00391∗∗ -0.00354∗ -0.00165
(0.00132) (0.00130) (0.00184) (0.00147) (0.00145) (0.00181)
Gender Gap -0.01025 -0.00844 -0.01077 0.00521 0.00387 0.00657
(0.01423) (0.01418) (0.01483) (0.01591) (0.01577) (0.01463)
Frac. Black -0.54892∗∗ -0.56211∗∗ -0.44155∗∗ 0.01986 0.03852 -0.01728
(0.11791) (0.11771) (0.13617) (0.13185) (0.13088) (0.13433)
Frac. Hisp. 0.27465 0.23108 0.33257† -0.55493∗∗ -0.53392∗∗ -0.23748
(0.17962) (0.17815) (0.19925) (0.20085) (0.19809) (0.19655)
Frac. HS DP 0.13233 0.12098 0.09186∗∗ 0.14240 0.15326 0.18223
(0.10080) (0.10054) (0.11732) (0.11271) (0.11179) (0.11574)
Max AFDC 0.06693∗∗ 0.06504∗∗ 0.09186∗∗ 0.06043∗∗ 0.06288∗∗ 0.07658∗∗
(0.00496) (0.00499) (0.00623) (0.00555) (0.00554) (0.00615)
Intercept -62.26066∗∗ -58.74095∗∗ -54.16074∗∗ 17.10579∗∗ 14.79859∗∗ 11.26589†
(5.22574) (5.07200) (6.52845) (5.84324) (5.63974) (6.44007)
State-Specific
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 857 857 705 857 857 705
R2 0.96154 0.96174 0.95876 0.97529 0.97135 0.97720
F 171.33623 172.25725 126.92143 270.51605 248.18175 233.96588
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
(Standard errors are in parenthesis.)
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Table A.2: Marriage Rate Regression without State-Specific Time Trends.
Dependent Variable Marriage Rate
CSE Measures
(5-Year Moving Average)
1) Collection 0.02396∗∗
(0.00525)
2) Expenditure 0.00112∗∗
(0.00020)
3) Paternity 0.00190†
(0.00101)
Average Wage -0.00017 -0.00027 -0.00034
(0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00021)
Unemp. Rate -0.00046∗∗ -0.00043∗∗ -0.00049∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00007)
Gender Gap -0.00168 -0.00117 0.00142
(0.00229) (0.00226) (0.00200)
Frac. Black 0.00816 0.00813 -0.00372
(0.00609) (0.00603) (0.00552)
Frac. Hisp. -0.02013 -0.01856 -0.00783
(0.01341) (0.01327) (0.01181)
Frac. HS DP 0.00443 0.00425 0.00519
(0.00502) (0.00496) (0.00458)
Max AFDC -0.00047† -0.00036 0.00018
(0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00027)
Intercept 2.34269∗∗ 2.20281∗∗ 1.96177∗∗
(0.26385) (0.25569) (0.26319)
State-Specific
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes
N 634 634 506
R2 0.96874 0.96933 0.98172
F 179.96616 183.53104 237.96394
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
(Standard errors are in parenthesis.)
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Table A.3: First Stage Regressions: Total Fertility Rate for Non-Marital and Marital
Births without State-Specific Time Trends.
Dependent Non-Marital Marital
Variable Total Fertility Rate Total Fertility Rate
CSE Measures
(3-Year Moving Average)
1) Collection -0.27859∗∗ -0.21389∗
(0.05941) (0.09147)
2) Expenditure -0.01735∗∗ -0.01440∗∗
(0.00218) (0.00341)
3) Paternity -0.03714∗∗ -0.07411∗∗
(0.01239) (0.01682)
Average Wage -0.00714† -0.00756∗ -0.00795∗ 0.02292∗∗ 0.02241∗∗ 0.02541∗∗
(0.00367) (0.00356) (0.00391) (0.00565) (0.00558) (0.00531)
Unemp. Rate 0.00132 0.00216† 0.00013 -0.00399∗ -0.00330† -0.00207
(0.00128) (0.00125) (0.00135) (0.00197) (0.00196) (0.00183)
Gender Gap 0.01130 0.01111 -0.00189 -0.03819 -0.03859 -0.05314∗
(0.01651) (0.01612) (0.01635) (0.02542) (0.02522) (0.02221)
Frac. Black -0.53101∗∗ -0.56611∗∗ -0.46910∗∗ 0.17598 0.14454 0.25145
(0.11912) (0.11648) (0.12910) (0.18341) (0.18224) (0.17534)
Frac. Hisp. 0.45978∗∗ 0.46487∗∗ 0.90602∗∗ 0.96065∗∗ 0.95865∗∗ 0.84388∗∗
(0.13544) (0.13121) (0.15132) (0.20853) (0.20530) (0.20552)
Frac. HS DP 0.25737∗∗ 0.25041∗∗ 0.07038 -0.49354∗∗ -0.49574∗∗ -0.52108∗∗
(0.09159) (0.08890) (0.09845) (0.14101) (0.13909) (0.13371)
Max AFDC 0.03307∗∗ 0.03569∗∗ 0.05378∗∗ 0.02653∗∗ 0.02868∗∗ 0.04181∗∗
(0.00357) (0.00350) (0.00501) (0.00549) (0.00547) (0.00680)
Intercept -62.40616∗∗ -62.74655∗∗ -55.96561∗∗ 39.13232∗∗ 38.45340∗∗ 38.05713∗∗
(2.55343) (2.27437) (2.37166) (3.93135) (3.55851) (3.22118)
State-Specific
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trends No No No No No No
Aggregate
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 908 908 806 908 908 806
R2 0.93801 0.94084 0.93834 0.92703 0.92807 0.93968
F 174.02847 228.5594 192.40494 182.59391 185.45679 196.96413
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
(Standard errors are in parenthesis.)
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Table A.4: Marriage Rate Regression without State-Specific Time Trends.
Dependent Variable Marriage Rate
CSE Measures
(3-Year Moving Average)
1) Collection -0.00957∗
(0.00411)
2) Expenditure 0.00014
(0.00017)
3) Paternity -0.00087
(0.00077)
Average Wage -0.00042† -0.00027 -0.00038†
(0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00023)
Unemp. Rate -0.00035∗∗ -0.00036∗∗ -0.00028∗∗
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00007)
Gender Gap 0.00036 0.00049 0.00043
(0.00324) (0.00327) (0.00307)
Frac. Black -0.01253† -0.01222 -0.01592∗
(0.00581) (0.00762) (0.00754)
Frac. Hisp. -0.01693 -0.01203 -0.01354
(0.01112) (0.01112) (0.01116)
Frac. HS DP -0.01542∗ -0.01594∗∗ -0.00984†
(0.00599) (0.00601) (0.00581)
Max AFDC 0.00002 -0.00004 0.00072∗
(0.00022) (0.00023) (0.00030)
Intercept 1.09778∗∗ 1.34034∗∗ 1.05778∗∗
(0.17297) (0.15891) (0.15130)
State-Specific
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Trends No No No
Aggregate
Trend Yes Yes Yes
N 681 681 591
R2 0.91392 0.91327 0.93437
F 120.64919 119.65849 150.47517
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
(Standard errors are in parenthesis.)
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A.3 Calibration for Intergenerational Analysis
This appendix lists the result of the calibration for intergenerational analysis. The
followings are the estimated value of the parameters, and the values for the targets.
Table A.5: Estimated Parameters for Intergenerational Exercise
Name Parameter Estimates
Parameter for Conditional Mean 1 3.385
Parameter for Conditional Mean 2 0.856
Parameter for Gender Gap µg 2.896
Parameter for Conditional Variance σg 0.125
Table A.6: The Match Between the Model and the Data for Intergenerational Exercise
Name Data Model
Log Mean of Human Capital for Women µfh 2.200 2.217
Log Mean of Human Capital for Men µmh 2.580 2.555
Log Variance of Human Capital for Women σfh 0.755 0.801
Log Variance of Human Capital for Men σmh 0.755 0.721
Intergenerational Correlation of Income ρg 0.730 0.711
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Block Recursive Equilibrium
This appendix proves the existence and uniqueness of the Block Recursive Equilibrium
for an economy without human capital depreciation (this extension is straightforward).
Definition. A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of value functions Ut for
unemployed workers, Vt for employed workers, Ft for previously matched firms and Gt
for newly matched firms, policy functions wut for unemployed workers and w
a
t for em-
ployed workers, a bargained wage function wbt determined between an employed worker
and a firm, a cutoff productivity function zbt , and a tightness function θt for t = 1, ..., T
such that (i) Ut, Vt, Ft, Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt depend on ψ only through y for
t = 1, ..., T , (ii) Ft, Gt and θt are consistent with the firm’s rationality and the free-
entry condition for t = 1, ..., T , (iii) Ut and w
u
t solve the unemployed worker’s problem
for t = 1, ..., T , (iv) Vt and w
a
t solve the employed worker’s problem for t = 1, ..., T , and
(v) wbt and z
b
t solve the bargaining problem between an employed worker and a firm for
t = 1, ..., T .
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Theorem. A recursive equilibrium exists and is block recursive and unique.
Proof. We construct a block recursive equilibrium. Denote a statement “Ut, Vt, Ft,
Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt are uniquely computed and they depend on ψ only through y
for t” as (St). We first show that (ST ) holds and then proceed by backward induction.
At age T the value of an unemployed worker with no job offer after the search stage
is:
UnT (h, ψ) = b,
and we can write as UnT (h, ψ) = U
n
T (h, y).
At the bargaining stage, if an agreement can be reached (the joint surplus is positive),
the value of remaining in the current match for a worker without an alternative job offer
is given by the bargained wage function:
wbT (h, z, ψ),
while the outside option at this stage is UnT (h, y), and the value of the firm (recalling
that FT+1 = 0) is:
−wbT (h, z, ψ) +
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h),
and the outside value of the firm is zero.
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Thus, at age T, the bargaining problem for the continuing match is:
max
{wb}
{
wb − b
}ξ{
− wb +
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h)
}1−ξ
,
the joint surplus is:
−b+
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h).
Let the cutoff productivity zbT (h, ψ) be the lowest z such that the joint surplus is
non-negative. Noting that y is the only necessary component in ψ to determine this
cutoff, zbT (h, ψ) = z
b
T (h, y).
If z ≥ zbT (h, y), the bargaining problem has a unique solution:
wbT (h, z, ψ) = (1− ξ) b+ ξ
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h),
otherwise the bargaining fails and the employed worker and the firm receive the outside
value. We can see that wbT (h, z, ψ) = w
b
T (h, z, y).
Therefore, at the bargaining stage the employed worker’s value is:
V bT (h, z, ψ) =

wbT (h, z, y) if z ≥ zbT (h, y),
b if z < zbT (h, y),
and the firm’s value is:
F bT (h, z, ψ) =

−wbT (h, z, y) +
∑
{z′} Λ(z
′ | z) f(y, z′, h) if z ≥ zbT (h, y),
0 if z < zbT (h, y).
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Noting that the right hand sides of the values do not have ψ except y, we can write
V bT (h, z, ψ) = V
b
T (h, z, y) and F
b
T (h, z, ψ) = F
b
T (h, z, y).
On the other hand, the value of the worker that has found an alternative job offer
is simply the wage posted in the market where he has searched:
V aT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = wa,
and this does not depend on ψ directly, so V aT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = V aT (w
a, h, z, y). The value
of the newly matched firm is:
GT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)− wa,
and hence GT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = GT (w
a, h, z, y).
Then, the free-entry condition for the firm at this stage is (for a wage w),
cv ≥ q(θT (w, h, ψ))GT (w, h, z, y)
and θT (w, h, ψ) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness. It follows that:
θT (w, h, ψ) =

q−1
(
cv
f(y,z,h)−w
)
if cv ≤ f(y, z, h)− w,
0 if cv > f(y, z, h)− w,
and hence θT (w, h, ψ) = θT (w, h, y) as the right hand side depends on ψ only through
y. Equivalently,
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w = f(y, z, h)− cvq(θT (w,h,y)) if cv ≤ f(y, z, h)− w,
θT (w, h, y) = 0 if cv > f(y, z, h)− w.
Thus, before the search stage the value of the matched worker is:
VT (h, z, ψ)
= max
{wa}
{
λep(θT (w
a, h, y))wa + (1− λep(θT (wa, h, y)))V bT (h, z, y)
}
,
= max
{wa}
{
λe(−cvθT (wa, h, y) + p(θT (wa, h, y))(f(y, z, h)− V bT (h, z, y))) + V bT (h, z, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λe(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− V bT (h, z, y))) + V bT (h, z, y)
}
,
so if f(y, z, h) ≤ V bT (h, z, y) then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective func-
tion is strictly concave in θ. Thus, this problem has a unique solution θaT (h, z, ψ).
Since the objective function depends on ψ only through y, θaT (h, z, ψ) = θ
a
T (h, z, y) and
VT (h, z, ψ) = VT (h, z, y). Therefore,
waT (h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)− cvq(θaT (h,z,y)) if θ
a
T (h, z, y) > 0,
waT (h, z, ψ) ≥ f(y, z, h)− cv if θaT (h, z, y) = 0.
Noting the market with θ = 0 is empty, without loss of generality:
waT (h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)−
cv
q(θaT (h, z, y))
,
and hence waT (h, z, ψ) = w
a
T (h, z, y).
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Similarly we have at the beginning of age T value of unemployment:
UT (h, ψ)
= max
{wu}
{
λup(θT (w
u, h, y))wu + (1− λup(θT (wu, h, y)))UnT (h, y)
}
,
= max
{wu}
{
λu(−cvθT (wu, h, y) + p(θT (wu, h, y))(f(y, z, h)− UnT (h, y))) + UnT (h, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λu(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− UnT (h, y))) + UnT (h, y)
}
,
so if f(y, z, h) ≤ UnT (h, y) then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective function
is strictly concave in θ. Thus, this problem has a unique solution θuT (h, ψ). Since the
objective function depends on ψ only through y, θuT (h, ψ) = θ
u
T (h, y) and UT (h, ψ) =
UT (h, y). Therefore, we uniquely specify as:
wuT (h, ψ) = f(y, z, h)−
cv
q(θuT (h, y))
,
and hence wuT (h, ψ) = w
u
T (h, y).
The beginning of age T value of the firm previously matched is
FT (h, z, ψ) = (1− λep(θT (w, h, y)))F bT (h, z, y),
so FT (h, z, ψ) = FT (h, z, y).
Therefore, we can see that (ST ) holds.
We are ready to go back to age T − 1. The value of a worker that has not found a
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job at the search stage is:
UnT−1(h, ψ) = b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)UT (h, y′),
so UnT−1(h, ψ) = U
n
T−1(h, y).
At the bargaining stage, if an agreement can be reached through Nash-bargaining,
the value for a worker of remaining in the match is:
wbT−1(h, z, ψ) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)
}
,
while the outside option at this stage is UnT−1(h, y). The value of the firm of remaining
in the match is:
−wbT−1(h, z, ψ) +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}
,
and the outside value of the firm is fixed at zero.
Thus, at age T − 1, the bargaining problem for the continuing match is:
max{wb}
wb + β∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)
}
− UnT−1(h, y)
ξ
×
−wb +∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}1−ξ
and the joint surplus is:
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∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β ((1− δ) (VT (h′, z′, y′) + FT (h′, z′, y′)) + δUT (h′, y′))
}
−UnT−1(h, y).
The cutoff productivity zbT−1(h, ψ) is the lowest z such that the joint surplus is non-
negative, and zbT−1(h, ψ) = z
b
T−1(h, y) as above.
If z ≥ zbT−1(h, y), the bargaining problem has a unique solution:
wbT−1(h, z, ψ) = ξ
{∑
{s′} Λ(s
′ | s) (f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′))
}
+(1− ξ)
{
UnT−1(h, y)− β
∑
{s′} Λ(s
′ | s) ((1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′))
}
,
otherwise the bargaining fails and the employed worker and the firm receive the outside
value. We can see that wbT−1(h, z, ψ) = w
b
T−1(h, z, y).
Therefore, at the bargaining stage the employed worker’s value is:
V bT−1(h, z, ψ) = w
b
T−1(h, z, y) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)
}
,
if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and V bT−1(h, z, ψ) = UnT−1(h, y) otherwise. The firm’s value is:
F bT−1(h, z, ψ) = −wbT−1(h, z, y) +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β(1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}
,
if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and F bT−1(h, z, ψ) = 0 otherwise. Thus, we can write V bT−1(h, z, ψ) =
V bT−1(h, z, y) and F
b
T−1(h, z, ψ) = F
b
T−1(h, z, y).
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On the other hand, the value of the worker that has found an alternative job offer
is:
V aT−1(w
a, h, z, ψ) = wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)),
so V aT−1(w
a, h, z, ψ) = V aT−1(w
a, h, z, y). The value of the newly matched firm is:
GT−1(wa, h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)− wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′),
and hence GT−1(wa, h, z, ψ) = GT−1(wa, h, z, y).
Then, the free-entry condition is:
cv ≥ q(θT−1(w, h, ψ))GT−1(w, h, z, y)
and θT−1(w, h, ψ) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness. It follows that:
θT−1(w, h, ψ) = q−1
(
cv
f(y,z,h)−wa+β∑{y′} Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′,z,y′)
)
if cv ≤ f(y, z, h) − w + β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′), and θT−1(w, h, ψ) = 0 otherwise,
so θT−1(w, h, ψ) = θT−1(w, h, y) as the right hand side depends on ψ only through y.
Equivalently,
w = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cvq(θT−1(w,h,y)) ,
if cv ≤ f(y, z, h)− w + β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′), and θT−1(w, h, ψ) = 0 otherwise.
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Thus, before the search stage the value of the matched worker is:
VT−1(h, z, ψ)
= max
{wa}
{
λep(θT−1(wa, h, y))[wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λep(θT−1(wa, h, y)))V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
,
= max
{wa}
{
λe(−cvθT−1(wa, h, y) + p(θT−1(wa, h, y))(f(y, z, h)
+β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) + (1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− V bT−1(h, z, y)))
+V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λe(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− V bT−1(h, z, y))) + V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
,
so if
f(y, z, h) +β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) + (1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)) ≤ V bT−1(h, z, y)
then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective function is strictly concave in
θ. Thus, this problem has a unique solution θaT−1(h, z, ψ). Then, θ
a
T−1(h, z, ψ) =
θaT−1(h, z, y) and VT−1(h, z, ψ) = VT−1(h, z, y) as above. Therefore, we uniquely specify:
waT−1(h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θaT−1(h, z, y))
,
and hence waT−1(h, z, ψ) = w
a
T−1(h, z, y).
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Similarly we have at the beginning of age T − 1 value of unemployment:
UT−1(h, ψ)
= max
{wu}
{
λup(θT−1(wu, h, y))[wu + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λup(θT−1(wu, h, y)))UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
= max
{wu}
{
λu(−cvθT−1(wu, h, y) + p(θT−1(wu, h, y))(f(y, z, h)
+β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) + (1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− UnT−1(h, y)))
+UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λu(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− UnT−1(h, y))) + UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
so if
f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) + (1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)) ≤ UnT−1(h, y)
then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective function is strictly concave in θ.
Thus, this problem has a unique solution θuT−1(h, ψ). Then, θ
u
T−1(h, ψ) = θ
u
T−1(h, y)
and UT−1(h, ψ) = UT−1(h, y). Therefore, we uniquely specify:
wuT−1(h, ψ) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θuT−1(h, y))
,
and hence wuT−1(h, ψ) = w
u
T−1(h, y).
The beginning of age T − 1 value of the firm previously matched is:
FT−1(h, z, ψ) = (1− λep(θT−1(w, h, y)))F bT−1(h, z, y),
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so FT−1(h, z, ψ) = FT−1(h, z, y).
Therefore, we can see that (ST ) implies (ST−1). Hence, by induction, (St) holds for
t = 1, ..., T , i.e. Ut, Vt, Ft, Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt are uniquely computed and they
depend on ψ only through y for t = 1, ..., T . 
B.2 Introducing the Tax Wedge
We introduce the tax wedge into the baseline framework, with a focus on the parts
of the model that are modified. With a tax wedge τ , if an agreement can be reached
through Nash-bargaining at the bargaining stage, the value for a worker of remaining
in the match is (at age T − 1):
(1− τ)wbT−1(h, z, y) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)
}
,
while the outside option at this stage is UnT−1(h, y). The value of the firm of remaining
in the match conserves its form. Thus, at age T − 1, the bargaining problem for the
continuing match is:
max{wb}
[
−wb +∑{s′} Λ(s′ | s){f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)}]1−ξ ×[
wb (1− τ) + β∑{s′} Λ(s′ | s){(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)}− UnT−1(h, y)]ξ
and τ · wb is subtracted from the joint surplus in the original problem.
The cutoff productivity zbT−1(h, y) is the lowest z such that the surplus of both firm
and worker are non-negative. If z ≥ zbT−1(h, y), the bargaining problem has a unique
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solution:
wbT−1(h, z, y)
= ξ
{∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s) (f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′))}
+
1− ξ
1− τ
{
UnT−1(h, y)− β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s) ((1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′))},
otherwise the bargaining fails and the employed worker and the firm receive the outside
value.
Therefore, at the bargaining stage the employed worker’s value is:
V bT−1(h, z, y) = w
b
T−1(h, z, y) (1− τ) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)
}
,
if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and V bT−1(h, z, y) = UnT−1(h, y) otherwise. The firm’s value is:
F bT−1(h, z, y) = −wbT−1(h, z, y) +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β(1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}
,
if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and F bT−1(h, z, y) = 0 otherwise.
On the other hand, the value of the worker that has found an alternative job offer
is:
V aT−1(w
a, h, z, y) = wa (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)),
and the value of the newly matched firm is:
GT−1(wa, h, z, y) = f(y, z, h)− wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′),
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Then, the free-entry condition is unchanged:
cv ≥ q(θT−1(w, h, y))GT−1(w, h, z, y)
and θT−1(w, h, y) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
Thus, before the search stage the value of the matched worker is:
VT−1(h, z, y)
= max
{wa}
{
λep(θT−1( · ))[wa (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ( · )((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λep(θT−1( · )))V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
Which can alternatively be written as:
VT−1(h, z, y)
= max
θ≥0
{
λe(−cvθ (1− τ) + p(θ)(f( · ) (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ( · )(FT (h′, z, y′) (1− τ)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− V bT−1(h, z, y))) + V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
Using the unique solution θaT−1(h, z, y) for the above problem, we can uniquely
specify:
waT−1(h, z, y) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θaT−1(h, z, y))
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Similarly we have at the beginning of age T − 1 value of unemployment:
UT−1(h, y)
= max
{wu}
{
λup(θT−1( · ))[wu (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ( · )((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λup(θT−1( · )))UnT−1(h, y)
}
Which can alternatively be expressed as:
UT−1(h, y)
= max
θ≥0
{
λu(−cvθ (1− τ) + p(θ)(f( · ) (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) (1− τ)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− UnT−1(h, y))) + UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
Therefore, using the unique solution θuT−1(h, y) for the above problem, we uniquely
specify:
wuT−1(h, y) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θuT−1(h, y))
The beginning of age T − 1 value of the firm previously matched is
FT−1(h, z, y) = (1− λep(θT−1(w, h, y)))F bT−1(h, z, y).
B.3 Expected Present Discounted Value of Earnings
We compute the expected present discounted value of earnings, for the case of no taxes.
At age T the value of an unemployed worker with no job offer after the search stage is
UnT (h, y) = b. We denote the expected present discounted value of earnings as Uˆ
n
T (h, y) =
0. At the bargaining stage the value of an employed worker is Vˆ bT (h, z, y) = w
b
T (h, z, y)
if z ≥ zbT (h, y) and Vˆ bT (h, z, y) = 0 otherwise. The value for a worker that finds an
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alternative job offer is V aT (w
a, h, z, y) = Vˆ aT (w
a, h, z, y) = wa. At the search stage the
earnings value of the workers is evaluated at the equilibrium θaT (h, z, y):
VˆT (h, z, y) = λe(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− Vˆ bT (h, z, y))) + Vˆ bT (h, z, y)
The earnings value of the unemployed worker at the search stage is:
UˆT (h, y) = λu(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− UˆnT (h, y))) + UˆnT (h, y)
evaluated at the equilibrium θuT (h, y). Going back one period, the earnings value of an
unemployed worker is:
UˆnT−1(h, y) = 0 + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) UˆT (h, y′)
By backward induction we can compute {Vˆt, Vˆ bt , Vˆ at , Uˆt, Uˆnt } for all t.
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